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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a multi-country Post-Kaleckian model augmented by a government 
sector with public spending and taxes on consumption, labour and capital and estimates it 
for the EU15 countries. We estimate country specific equations to find the effect of income 
distribution, public spending and taxes on growth, on each component of private aggregate 
demand (i.e., consumption, investment, and net exports) and on budget balance for the 
EU15 countries. Next, we calculate a Europe-wide multiplier based on the responses of 
each country to changes not only in domestic income distribution, taxation and 
government expenditure but also to changes in the other European countries’ wage share, 
taxes and public spending. One novelty of this paper is that it goes beyond an isolated 
country-by-country analysis and integrates cross-country effects of a simultaneous change 
in the wage share on demand in Europe in a government augmented Post-Kaleckian 
model. Extending the model by taxes on labour and capital increases the likelihood of a 
wage-led economic regime. The fiscal multiplier effects are much stronger when policies 
are implemented simultaneously, and wage, tax and public spending policies are 
integrated into the policy mix. The impact of egalitarian wage policies are positive but 
small; the overall stimulus becomes much stronger when mixed with fiscal expansion. 
Expansionary fiscal policy is sustainable when wage, public spending and progressive tax 
policies are combined. The analysis of the paper can guide the development of a fiscal 
and wage policy mix conducive to equitable development. 
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1. Introduction 
The outbreak of the Great Recession and sluggish growth in the aftermath in most European 
countries has rekindled interest in the effect of fiscal policy on growth, as evidenced in the 
vast literature on fiscal multiplier effects (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013; Gechert, 2015). 
Although it has been shown that austerity policies have negative effects on growth and private 
investment, contributing to the prolonged stagnation in Europe (Cozzi et al., 2016), fiscal 
contraction continues to be the dominant European strategy in the post-crisis era.  
At the same time inequality has increased significantly since 1980s in all the major 
developed and developing countries with a simultaneous fall in the share of labour income in 
national income and a rise in top income shares (Stockhammer, 2015). The negative impact of 
inequality on growth has been well evidenced in empirical research based on both supply-side 
growth models (Barro, 2000; Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa, 2007; Berg et al. 2012) and post-
Keynesian demand-led growth models (Naastepad and Storm, 2006; Hein and Vogel, 2008; 
Stockhammer et al, 2009; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Onaran and Obst, 2016).  
However, the combined effects of fiscal policy and income distribution on economic 
growth and fiscal performance have not yet been empirically investigated in the context of 
demand-led growth models. Theoretically, this issue has been explored in various Kaleckian 
models. Blecker (2002) and Palley (2014) have analysed how different tax rates on labour and 
capital income affect whether the demand and growth regime of an economy is wage-led or 
profit-led. Mott and Slattery (1994), Commendatore et al. (2011), Seguino (2012), Dutt 
(2013), Palley (2013), Hein (2016), amongst others, have studied the effects of functional 
income distribution and government expenditures on various macroeconomic variables, such 
as capital accumulation, labour productivity, inflation and public debt. Blecker (1999) has 
examined open economy issues within a Kaleckian model with government expenditures and 
taxes. However, in the Kaleckian literature there is still a lack of a detailed empirical analysis 
of the joint effects of income distribution and fiscal policy.  
The novelty of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a Post-Kaleckian theoretical model 
that incorporates a government sector within an open economy context. The model moves 
beyond the above-mentioned Kaleckian models because (i) it is a multi-country model that 
allows the analysis of the interactions between countries and (ii) incorporates an explicit 
distinction between different types of government expenditures, permitting a careful analysis 
of the different growth effects of each expenditure category. Second, we use this model in 
order to estimate econometrically the effects of income distribution and fiscal policy on the 
components of aggregate demand (consumption, investment and net exports) for each of the 
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EU15 1  countries. We calculate a Europe-wide multiplier based on the responses of each 
country to changes in not only domestic but also other European countries’ income 
distribution, taxation and government spending. Hence, we move beyond Onaran and Galanis 
(2014) and Onaran and Obst (2016) who presented the impact of simultaneous changes in 
income distribution in the G20 and EU15 but did not incorporate the impact of public 
spending and taxes. From a policy perspective, the analysis of the paper can guide the 
development of a fiscal and wage policy mix conducive to equitable development.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data sources. Section 3 
outlines the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the estimation methodology. Section 5 
presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 6 discusses a wage and fiscal policy mix 
and its implications for growth, private investment, trade balance, and budget balance. 
Finally, section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Data  
The data used in the econometric estimation comes from the annual macro-economic database 
of the European Commission (AMECO) and the OECD national accounts, in most cases for 
the period between 1960 and 2013. Our model includes various variables about the macro 
economy, the distribution of income, the government sector and the open economy. The 
definition of the variables and the details of the data sources are reported in Appendix A.  
We use implicit tax rates (ITR) on capital (  ), labour (  ), and consumption (  ). The tax 
rates are based on the dataset provided by Onaran et al. (2012) which itself draws on the data 
reported by the European Commission (2000) as well as Eurostat online database with data 
ranging between 1970 and 2007. We extend this dataset to 2012 using the growth rate of the 
data provided by Eurostat (2015).  
In our econometric estimations we focus attention only on these components of 
government expenditures that are part of GDP. These are the gross capital formation (  ), 
individual consumption expenditure (  ) and the collective consumption expenditure (  ) of 
the general government. On average,   ,    and    constitute roughly 50 per cent of total 
government expenditures in our sample. An important part of the rest government 
expenditures is the social benefits in kind and other current transfers. These expenditures are 
                                                 
1
 EU15 refers to the 15 West European old member states of the EU, which includes the UK. Despite the Brexit 
decision we keep the UK as part of our analysis for Europe, as policy coordination issues we discuss in the paper 
can be implemented even when countries are not part of a political union, although we recognise the importance 
of political union to facilitate such policy coordination. 
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included in our theoretical model but are not part of our empirical estimations due to limited 
data availability (e.g. social benefits in cash start only in 1995 for most EU15 countries). 
 
3. A post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian macro model with government  
In this section we present our multi-country demand-led growth model for the EU15 
countries. The model is based on a Post-Kaleckian framework2; however, the behavioural 
functions also encompass standard Keynesian models (e.g. Blanchard, 2006). We integrate 
fiscal policy (tax rates, government expenditures, public debt) into the private sector open 
economy model presented in Onaran and Obst (2016).  
We model the effects of a change in the profit share and fiscal policy by means of 
analysing the country level effects on private aggregated demand: consumption, investment, 
exports and imports. We then estimate European interactions through integrating the effects of 
a change in the profit share as well as fiscal policy of other EU15 countries.  
Consumption ( ) is given by:  
                                                                        (1) 
where            denotes after-tax adjusted profits, 
          denotes after-
tax adjusted wages,    denotes ITR on capital income,    denotes ITR on labour income,   
denotes social benefits in cash and     denotes other current transfers. Compared to Onaran 
and Obst (2016), consumption function (1) has two new features: first, it includes ITR on 
capital income and ITR on labour income; second, it incorporates the social benefits in cash 
and other current transfers, which augment the disposable income of households. We 
hypothesise that a more progressive tax system (taxes on capital increasing while those on 
labour decreasing) supports a wage-led economic regime, whereas a more regressive tax 
system would help growth in a profit-led regime.  
Private investment     is modelled based on two alternative specifications. Our first 
specification is the following:  
                                                                      
 
 
               (2) 
where    is autonomous investment and captures the effects of ‘animal spirits’,     is 
private output3,            denotes after-tax adjusted profit share,   denotes government 
expenditures and     is the ratio of domestic government debt to GDP. Profit share is an 
                                                 
2 Our model is a version of the Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). Theoretically, aggregate demand can be either 
wage-led or profit-led depending on how the effects on  ,  , and     add up. 
3 Private output is calculated as total GDP ( ) minus total government expenditure (             
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indicator for expected profitability as well as the availability of internal finance. Private GDP 
is a proxy for capacity utilisation with positive accelerator effects on private investment. 
Compared to Onaran and Obst (2016), we have made three extensions: first, we assume that 
firms consider after-tax profits in making investment decisions as widely assumed in the 
literature (see e.g. Rowthorn, 1981; Blecker, 2002; Seguino, 2012); second, we include public 
debt as a ratio to GDP, which allows us to take into account possible financial crowding out 
effects which (see Dutt, 2013); third, we introduce total government expenditures in order to 
examine potential crowding-in effects that might stem from the fact that government 
expenditures can improve business environment and increase future output.  
Our second alternative specification for investment is the following:  
                                   
                                                                     
 
 
                            (2’) 
where    is individual consumption expenditure,    is collective consumption expenditure 
and    is gross capital formation expenditure. The difference between equation (2) and 
equation (2’) is that the latter includes a disaggregation of government expenditures into 
different categories drawing broadly on Seguino (2012) who clusters government 
expenditures into investment in physical and social infrastructure in order to capture their 
different crowding-in effects. In equation (2’) individual consumption comprises the social 
transfers in kind that are provided to individual households. Collective consumption refers to 
collective goods and services that are provided by the government to all members of the 
society. Both collective and individual consumption include expenditures related to health, 
education and culture. Public investment includes, amongst others, investment in 
transportation, construction and other physical capital.   
We expect that each of these types of expenditures has a different impact on private 
investment. However, due to severe data limitations with rather short time series and 
multicollinearity issues, this detailed specification is unlikely to capture potentially significant 
effects of different types of public spending; therefore we present the empirical results of this 
specification only as a robustness check and interpret them as indicative results4.  
                                                 
4 This also implies that for the multiplier estimations we only consider equation (2) that integrates government 
expenditures ( ). 
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In order to integrate the effects of expansionary fiscal policy on growth in the EU14 we 
define an exogenous increase in government expenditures as a fraction of national income 
(GDP)5: 
                                                                                                                                        (3) 
In disaggregated form this exogenous increase is equal to: 
        (3’) 
        (3’’) 
        (3’’’) 
In our model the total primary government expenditures (      are equal to: 
                                                                                                                                (4) 
Taxes6 ( ) can be expressed as: 
                                                                                                                          (5) 
where   C is taxes on private consumption and    is VAT on domestic prices.  
The interest rate on government debt ( ) is: 
                                                                    
 
   
                                                               (6) 
The national income identity (   is given by: 
                                                                                                          (7) 
The total wage bill (W) is given by: 
                                                                                                                                (8) 
where   wage is bill in the private sector and    denotes total wage bill in the 
government sector.  
Private sector’s operating surplus ( ) is identical to: 
                                                                                                   (9) 
where X are exports and  are imports. The debt of the government sector is: 
                                                                                                                  (10) 
where     denotes debt of the previous period and      is the interest payments on 
government debt of the previous period. For simplicity, we assume away the asset side of the 
balance of the government.   
Domestic prices     and export prices (    are determined as follows: 
                                                 
5
 We assume that the government decides on expansionary fiscal policy targets taking into account the share of 
( ) in national income (GDP) rather than the absolute value.  
6 However, the tax intake only represents a (crucial) part of government revenues leaving aside other revenue 
streams such as property income or national insurance payments.  
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                                                                                        (11) 
                                                                                    (12) 
where     are nominal unit labour costs,    are import prices,    is VAT at home and      
is VAT abroad. We model the effects of distribution on net exports using a stepwise approach 
that follows Stockhammer et al. (2009), Onaran et al. (2011) and Onaran and Galanis (2014). 
First, domestic prices and export prices are a behavioural function of nominal unit labour 
costs and import prices (as a proxy for non-labour input costs), based on a mark-up pricing 
model in an imperfectly competitive economy. We extend the specification of domestic and 
export prices by including VAT at home and abroad.  
Exports are given by equation (13): 
                                          
 
  
                                                (13) 
where     is the GDP of the rest of the world and   is the exchange rate. Exports are a 
behavioural function of relative prices of exports to imports and the GDP of the rest of the 
world. 
Imports     are a function of domestic prices relative to import prices (    ), private 
GDP, government expenditures and exchange rate:  
                          
 
  
                                                 (14) 
We include government expenditures to account for the import content in government 
spending as suggested by Palley (2009).  
In parallel to the alternative investment specification, we also estimate an alternative 
specification where we disaggregate government expenditure into the three different types in 
the import function: 
                      
 
  
                         
                                                                                                       (14’) 
The sum of partial effects of a change in π on consumption, investment, and net exports 
         is the effect on private excess demand. This, in turn, will further affect 
consumption, investment, and imports through the multiplier mechanism7.   
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Appendix B for the derivation of the national multiplier integrating fiscal policy.  
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3.1. Effects of a simultaneous change in the profit share and fiscal policy 
Until now, we have ignored the effects following a simultaneous change in distribution in 
Europe; however, this overestimates the positive effects of a fall in the wage share on net 
exports. European economies are integrated and, as recommended by the EC, all countries are 
trying to compete on the basis of wage costs. Therefore, while higher openness of an economy 
increases the relevance of the positive effects of a fall in the wage share, the simultaneous 
implementation of the same wage moderation strategy in a variety of European countries 
diminishes the positive effects on net exports. Given the high economic integration of the 
European economy8, a full understanding of the simultaneous fall in the wage share requires 
an integrated Europe-wide analysis. Following the modelling strategy in Onaran and Obst 
(2016) we simulate the effects of a simultaneous decline in the wage share on growth in 
Europe. Hence, the European multiplier mechanism incorporates the effects of a change in the 
profit share on AD of each economy through the changes in import prices and the GDP of 
trade partners. For the case of 15 countries, the percentage change in GDP of each country is 
given by: 
           
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
    
 
 
 
        
   
 
    
         
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
    
 
 
 
        
   
 
     
        
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
    
 
 
 
               (15) 
The matrices   and    represent the effects of a change in each country’s own profit share 
on demand in that particular country.   is a matrix, whose diagonal elements are the effect of 
a change in profit share in country j on private excess demand (            ) in 
country j. Matrix    reflects the national multiplier effects and hence shows the effect of an 
autonomous change in private excess demand on AD. Matrix   illustrates the effect of a 
change in trade partners’ profit share on import prices and hence on net exports in each 
country. Finally, matrix  shows effects of a change in trade partners’ GPD on exports of 
each country. The details are in Appendix B.  
Solving equation (15) for  
  
 
  gives us the equivalent of a European multiplier effect: 
                   
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
    
 
 
 
                        
                  
   
 
    
                     (16) 
                                                 
8
 In 2013, the greater proportion of EU countries total trade in goods was with partners within the EU-28 with an 
average of 62% of total exports (Eurostat, 2015).  
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Moreover, in order to take into account the simultaneous change in public spending we 
model the impact of a 1% point increase in government expenditure ( ) as a ratio to GDP on 
the percentage change in GDP of each country is given by: 
                             
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
    
 
 
 
         
    
 
     
         
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
    
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
    
 
 
 
                    (17) 
The matrices    and    represent the effects of a change in each country’s own public 
spending on demand in that particular country.    is a matrix, whose diagonal elements are 
the effect of a change in     in country j on excess demand (        ) in country j
9. 
Matrix    reflects the national multiplier effects and hence shows the effect of an 
autonomous change in excess demand (        ) on AD via national multiplier 
effects. The details are in Appendix B.  
Solving equation (17) for  
  
 
  gives us the equivalent of a European multiplier effect of 
public spending10: 
                             
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
    
 
 
 
                        
            
    
 
     
                    (18) 
Finally, we consider a change in tax policy and hence model the impact of a 1% point 
increase change in the ITR on capital income: 
               
  
 
 
    
  
   
    
    
   
           
    
 
     
         
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
    
    
 
 
 
        
   
    
    
   
                (19) 
The matrices     and    represent the effects of a change in each country’s own taxation 
on demand in that particular country.     is a matrix, whose diagonal elements are the effect 
of a change in    in country j on excess demand (        ) in country j. Matrix    
reflects the national multiplier effects and hence shows the effect of an autonomous change in 
excess demand (        ) on AD. The details are given in Appendix B.  
                                                 
9 An increase in public spending produces an increase in the wages of the public sector employees, affecting the 
wage share. For simplicity, we assume away this effect. If this effect was taken into account, an increase in 
public spending would provide a further boost to economic activity. We account for an effect on private 
investment ( ) twice since there is a direct positive effect of an increase in public spending on private investment 
(crowding in) as well as a direct negative effect of an increase in public debt on private investment (crowding 
out).  
10 We do the same method for disaggregated government expenditure (        ) and estimate a European 
multiplier effect. The details are given in Appendix B.  
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Solving equation (19) for  
  
 
  gives us the equivalent of a European multiplier effect of a 
change in ITR on capital income11: 
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3.2 Policy mix and total effects on budget balance, investment, net exports and inflation 
Next, we model the effects of a policy mix (   ) that combines (a) a change in income 
distribution and government expenditure; (b) a change in ITR on capital income and ITR on 
labour income; (c) a combined change in income distribution, government expenditure, and 
ITR on capital and labour income in all countries integrating both national and cross-country 
multiplier effects, which is a novelty of this paper. 
For policy mix (a) we model a 1% fall in the profit share and 1% increase in public 
spending. The total European multiplier effect on equilibrium AD of each country is given by: 
 
  
 
 
    
                        
                   
   
 
    
          
    
 
     
   (21) 
For policy mix (b) we model a progressive tax policy based on a 1% increase in the ITR on 
capital income and a 1% fall in the ITR on labour income. The total European multiplier 
effect on equilibrium AD of each country is given by: 
 
  
 
 
    
                        
            
    
 
     
           
    
 
     
  )             (22) 
For policy mix (c) we model the joined effect of all 4 policy changes. The total European 
multiplier effect on AD of each country is:  
 
  
 
 
    
 
                       
                   
   
 
    
  
                                        
    
 
     
           
    
 
     
           
    
 
     
  )                       
(23) 
Next, we calculate effects of the policy mix on investment and the budget balance 
integrating both national and cross-country multiplier effects. The total effect on investment 
ultimately depends on the character of the accumulation regimes (Onaran and Obst, 2016). 
                                                 
11 We follow the same approach for a change in ITR on labour income, which is outlined in Appendix B.  
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The total effect of a change in income distribution, government expenditure, and ITRs on 
capital and labour income on investment is as follows: 
    
  
 
    
   
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
  
 
    
   
 
    
   
 
    
    
 
    
   
 
    
   
 
    
   
  
 
  
  
 
     
  
                                                           
     
   
 
     
   
 
     
   
                                                         
(24) 
We estimate the total effects of a simultaneous change in income distribution, government 
expenditures, and ITRs on capital and labour income on the budget balance as follows: 
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4. Estimation methodology 
We analyse the effects of a change in income distribution and public investment on 
economic growth by means of estimating separate single equations for consumption, 
investment, exports, imports, and domestic prices and export prices.  
The caveats and qualifications concerning the single equation approach (SEA) have been 
discussed in Onaran and Obst (2016). We chose the SEA approach over systems estimations 
such as vector autoregressive models (VAR). The applied estimation approach has the 
convenience of having a clearer interpretation of the results but might introduce some bias 
resulting from endogeneity issues and single-equation-based estimations. The main alternative 
of using a VAR model, however, comes with its own issues.  
Unit root tests suggest that most of our variables are integrated of order one12. The profit 
share is stationary in Denmark, Greece, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Hence we use this 
variable in its level in these countries. ECM is applied wherever statistically significant.  
In the short-run specifications we start with general specification with both 
contemporaneous values as well as first lags of the variables and include lagged dependent 
variables. We only keep those variables, which are statistically significant. In order to test for 
autocorrelation we use the Breusch-Godfrey test due to severe limitations in the Durbin 
Watson test statistic. In case of autocorrelation, either we keep the lagged dependent variable 
or add an AR(1) term. As outlined in Onaran and Obst (2016), we derive the long-term 
                                                 
12 Results are available upon request.  
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coefficients (elasticities) using two different methods depending on whether there is a short-
run (differenced form) or long-run relationship (ECM) among the variables. 
5. Estimation results 
The estimation results for consumption are given in table 1. After-tax wages and after-tax 
profits13 show significant expected effects in all EU14 countries, except in Spain (negative 
effect of profit income on consumption) and Sweden (positive but insignificant effects of 
profit income on consumption). However, estimating a reduced sample size between 1960 and 
2007 without the crisis years shows that the perverse effects in Spain are driven by the 
significant policy changes in capital tax14 after the outbreak of the Great Recession in 200715. 
The hypothesis that the MPC out of profit income is larger than out of wage income is 
confirmed in all countries.  
Table 1 
Table 2 
Table 3 
Table 4 
Table 5 
Table 6 
Table 2 presents the effects on private investment based on equation (2)16 including total 
government expenditure ( ). In order to take into account the lag structure of the effect we 
have run investment specification with ( ) in contemporaneous and lagged form17. There are 
positive significant effects of G in 9 EU countries: Austria, Finland, Greece, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. This presents the vast majority of our 
sample and hence indicates the importance of a public investment stimulus. Only in France, 
the effects of total government expenditure on private investment are negative18. We find 
                                                 
13
 After-tax profits are calculated by multiplying profit income with (    ). We extended data for Greece and 
Portugal from 1980 back to 1970 assuming a constant tax ratio and for Spain and Sweden back to 1960. We did 
the same for after-tax wage income assuming a constant tax ratio on labour (  ) for the same set of countries. 
After-tax wages are calculated by multiplying the wage bill with (     ).  
14
 The ITR on capital was significantly reduced from 42% to 26% in that short time period.  
15
 We have run a robustness check for all EU14 countries estimating the reduced sample size 1970-2007. 
However, our results hold robust for all countries. Hence, we only take the reduced sample size for Spain.  
16 We present further robustness checks of our results regarding private investment in Appendix E and discuss 
the results in section 6.3 below.  
17
 Moreover, in order to avoid issues with only a few degrees of freedom we estimated G in moving sum of 3 and 
5 years. However, our results are robust.   
18
 We also found negative significant effects for the UK in the full sample 1960-2012. However, when running a 
robustness check with a reduced sample size (1960-2007) the significant negative effects in UK do not hold true. 
Hence, we dropped (G) here. For France, the negative effects of (G) hold true also in the reduced sample, hence 
we keep the original estimation. The results are presented in Appendix E table E4. 
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strong and significant accelerator effects of private GDP on private investment in all 
countries. Regarding the after-tax profit share 19  the effects are more varied. It has no 
statistically significant effect in 9 countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK20. In these cases, the effects are treated as zero when we 
calculate the total effects on private excess demand. We find significant negative effects of an 
increase in public debt on private investment, which represents evidence of crowding out 
effects in 8 countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
UK.  
The estimation results for domestic prices, export prices, exports, and imports are given in 
tables 3 to 621. We include VAT into domestic and export prices22 as well as total government 
expenditure in the import function. The results are in line with our expectations; however, 
there are no significant effects of export prices relative to import prices on exports in 
Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal. We also find no statistically 
significant effects of domestic prices relative to import prices in Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, and the UK. Appendix D summarises the effects of a change in profit 
share on     and   .  
The total effect does not only depend on the elasticity of exports and imports on relative 
prices and the pass-through from labour costs on prices but also on the relative size of each 
component in GDP. Therefore, in small open economies the effects are likely to be much 
larger compared to large relatively closed economies. Regarding VAT we find statistically 
significant effects on domestic prices in 7 countries: Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK. In regards to export prices we find statistically significant effects in only 
3 countries: Denmark, Germany and Italy. An increase in government expenditure leads to an 
increase in imports in 6 countries: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. 
 
5.1. National effects 
Table 7 summarises the effects of a 1% increase in the profit share on components of 
private AD: consumption, investment, exports and imports. The first column reports the 
                                                 
19
 We have calculated after-tax profit share by multiplying profit share with     . We have extended data back 
to 1960 for all countries assuming a constant tax ratio on capital.   
20
 When we compare our results to previous findings in the empirical literature (Onaran and Obst, 2016) we find 
a general breakdown of the profit-investment nexus since the start of the Great Recession in 2007. Taking after-
tax profits this issue becomes even more apparent. Only 5 EU countries have a statistically significant 
profitability effect.  
21 Our export equation has not been modified; hence the results are identical to Table 5 in Onaran and Obst 
(2016).  
22 In the export price function       is a weighted average calculated by multiplying    in country j multiplied 
with the share of exports (in total exports) of country i that are exported to country j.   
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partial effects on consumption. In comparison to our estimates for the EU15 countries 
presented in Onaran and Obst (2016), which do not take the role of taxes into account, the 
difference in MPC is significantly larger in the majority of countries with differences ranging 
from -0.34 (Ireland) to -0.86 (Spain). Only for Belgium and Italy we find surprisingly low 
(but significant) differences in MPC of -0.17 and -0.21 respectively. On average, our mean 
differential is 0.4423.  
Table 7 
The second column gives the partial effects on private investment. A 1% point increase in 
  in the EU14 countries leads to a partial positive effect on private investment with the effect 
ranging between 0.09%-points (Italy) and 0.34%-points (Belgium) as a ratio to GDP. The 
marginal effects of public spending are positive in the majority of countries and range 
between 0.32%-points (Germany) and 0.63%-points (Sweden). France is the only country 
with a negative effect of -0.36%-points. Public debt has a significant negative effect in 8 
countries with effects ranging between -0.05%-points (Spain) and -0.28%-points (Finland). In 
comparison, the negative crowding out effects are thus much lower than the positive effects of 
public spending.   
If we sum up the effects of an increase in   on domestic private demand, the negative 
effect on consumption is substantially larger than the positive effect on investment in absolute 
values in 14 out of 15 countries24. Thus, domestic demand in the EU15 is clearly wage-led. 
The integration of the foreign sector has a crucial role to play in determining whether an 
economy is wage-led or profit-led. The effects of an increase in   on net exports range 
between 0.06%-points in Belgium and 0.4%-points in Austria, as a ratio to GDP. Column F 
sums up the partial effects on private excess demand when the   increases in each country in 
isolation. Strikingly, the integration of the foreign sector does not lead to a change of the 
demand regime. Belgium already had profit-led domestic demand due to low differences in 
MPC and high investment effects. 
Column G reports the multiplier, which was calculated using the elasticities of  ,  ,  and 
  with respect to   (see Appendix B)25. As expected, the multipliers are above one and range 
                                                 
23
Marglin and Bhaduri (1992) find a mean differential of 0.37 for a sample of 16 OECD countries. For 
Luxembourg the MPC is based on pre-tax wages and pre-tax profits.  
24
 Belgium is the exception in our sample. This finding is in alignment with our estimations in Onaran and Obst 
(2016). However, domestic demand in Denmark is now wage-led. 
25
 The results illustrate short run multiplier effects.  
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between 1.04 in Belgium and 5.05 in Greece26. In comparison to the multipliers estimated in 
Onaran and Obst (2016) when integrating fiscal policy27 the multiplier becomes significantly 
larger. For countries with multipliers larger than one the effect of a change in distribution on 
demand becomes amplified. Column H reports the per cent change in equilibrium demand 
after the multiplier mechanism.  
Table 8 presents 3 fiscal policy changes including (1) an increase in public spending by 1% 
point of GDP; (2) a 1% point increase in ITR on capital income, (3) a 1% point decrease in 
ITR on labour income, first in each country in isolation and then in all countries 
simultaneously. For the details on the calculations see Appendix B. 
Table 8 
As a response to increasing public spending in each country in isolation, 
                  (Column A) is increasing in all countries with effects ranging between 
0.52% (Belgium) and 1.51% (Austria). Column B shows the multipliers that take into account 
positive accelerator effects of output as well as negative crowding out effects of an increase in 
public debt. As expected, multipliers following a change in public spending are larger on 
average compared to multipliers following a change in income distribution (Table 7 Column 
G). The total effects on AD are significantly positive for all countries as can be seen in 
column C. Following an isolated 1% points increase in     equilibrium AD increases by 
roughly 3% in Austria or 7% in Greece.  
As a result of a rise in taxes on capital in each country in isolation,                   
(Column E) declines in all countries with effects ranging between -0.07% (Finland) and -
0.17% (Belgium). An increase in taxation on profits will have negative effects on 
consumption as well as investment (through reducing profitability). The multipliers take into 
account the direct effect of a change in ITR on capital income on tax revenues as well as the 
indirect accelerator effects of output on government expenditure and possible negative public 
debt effects on private investment (see Appendix B for details). When the multiplier 
mechanism is taken into account these effects become amplified leading to a significant 
decline of equilibrium AD in all counties (Column G). For instance, equilibrium AD 
decreases by 0.50% in the Netherlands and by 0.66 in Greece. 
                                                 
26
 The results for Luxembourg (0.560) do not include government sector in the calculation but are based on the 
estimations in Onaran and Obst (2016). Stockhammer et al. (2009) find multipliers ranging between 1.4 and 2.7 
for the Euro area (hypothetical aggregate of EU12 countries). 
27
 We augment the multiplier by taking into account the effects of public spending and public debt on private 
investment as well as the effects of (G) on imports. Moreover, we account for the effect of output on government 
expenditure. 
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In response to a 1%-point decline in taxes on labour in each country in isolation, 
                  (Column I) increases in all countries with effect ranging between 0.26% 
(Belgium) and 0.64% (Spain). The decrease in ITR on labour income will induce 
consumption and hence increase demand in the economy. When the multiplier mechanism is 
taken into account the effects become amplified with effects ranging between 0.30 (Belgium) 
and 2.86 (Spain). 
Appendix F table F1 shows the effects of a 1% fall in the profit share, a 1%-point increase 
in G/Y and    as well as 1% decrease in    on investment. The investment regime is wage-
led, e.g. the effect of a fall in   on     is positive in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK. The effects are ranging from strong positive 
effects in wage-led countries such as Spain (0.62%-points) to moderate negative effects in 
profit-led countries such as Belgium (-0.38%-points).  
The effect of a 1% fall in   on the trade balance is negative with effects ranging between 
0.08%-points in Italy and 0.44%-points in |Austria. Belgium is an exception due to low 
positive net export effects via the price channel and a strong fall in imports following the fall 
in AD as a profit led country.  
As expected, the effects of a 1% increase in   on investment are positive and range 
between 0.27%-points in France28 and 2.0%-points in Finland capturing positive crowding in 
and demand effects as well as negative debt effects on private investment. The effects on the 
trade balance are negative in all countries due to increased demand for imports.  
The effects of an increase in ITR on capital income on private investment are negative in 
all countries with the effects ranging between 0.03%-points (Austria) and 0.13%-points 
(Greece). On the contrary, a fall in ITR on labour income would lead to positive effects on 
private investment. The effects are strong in countries with high differences in MPC such as 
in Portugal (0.84%-points).  
Table F3 in Appendix F shows the effects on budget balance if the policies are 
implemented in isolation. A 1% fall in the profit share leads to an improvement in the budget 
balance in all countries except in Belgium. Since 14 EU countries are wage-led an increase in 
the wage share has positive effects on GDP growth. An increase in public spending, however, 
leads to a deterioration of the budget balance with effects ranging from -0.49%-points 
(Austria) to -0.98%-points (Greece). A 1% increase in taxation on capital income as well as a 
1% fall in taxation on wages both lead to an improvement in the budget balance with the latter 
                                                 
28 France had a negative partial effect of government expenditure and also a significant negative effect of public 
debt effect on I.  
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having significantly larger positive effects. Overall, a combined change in the 4 policies leads 
to in improvement in the majority of the countries except in Belgium, Greece and Ireland.  
 
5.2. Europe-wide effects 
Next we analyse the effects of a simultaneous 1% point increase in the profit share in all 
EU15 countries. Column I in Table 7 presents the results. Most strikingly, all countries start to 
contract after the incorporation of further effects on their net exports. Comparing columns H 
and I, wage-led economies experience even stronger negative effects on demand. Demand 
decreases by between 0.39% (Italy) and 3.80% (Spain). Belgium, the only profit-led country, 
also starts contracting (0.39%) after a race to the bottom in the wage share in Europe. Overall, 
a simultaneous decline in the wage share in all countries leads to a decline in EU15 GDP by 
1.45%29.  
Furthermore, we analyse the effects of a simultaneous 1% point increase in public 
spending in all EU15 countries. Column D in table 8 presents the results. Indeed, all countries 
would experience significant positive effects on equilibrium AD with values ranging between 
2.09% (UK) and 10.04% (Finland). Overall, EU15 GDP increases by 3.82% indicating the 
significant positive effects of an increase in public spending on output through the multiplier 
mechanism. The effects of fiscal expansion are now stronger compared to fiscal expansion in 
one country in isolation due to high cross-country spillovers30.  
Taking into account taxation policies we analyse the effects of a simultaneous 1% point 
increase in the ITR on capital income as well as a simultaneous 1% point decrease in the ITR 
on labour income. The former leads to negative effects in all countries ranging with values 
ranging between 0.18% (Ireland) and 0.80% (Netherlands). Overall, EU 15 GDP would 
decrease by 0.36%. However, the positive effects on demand following a simultaneous 
decrease in ITR on wages are significantly larger in comparison. AD increases by 0.93% in 
Italy or 3.66% in Spain. EU15 GDP increases by 1.79%. We will contrast these effects 
directly with each other in section 7. 
                                                 
29
 Onaran and Obst (2016) found a decline in EU15 GDP by 0.30% following a 1%-point fall in the wage share 
in Europe.  
30 The empirical significance of spillover effects as well as the importance of coordination of fiscal policies is 
also confirmed in for instance Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013).  
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Next, we report the effects on investment and net exports following a simultaneous change 
in income distribution, government expenditure, and implicit tax rates on capital and labour 
income31. 
Table G2 shows that effects of a simultaneous 1% point fall in the profit share on 
investment are positive in 13 countries (now also including France, Netherlands and Sweden). 
Only Belgium and Italy have a profit-led investment regime in this case. On average, private 
investment increases by 0.20%-points, as a ratio to GDP. This is a striking finding, indicating 
that the accumulation regime is wage-led in the vast majority of the EU15 countries when we 
take simultaneous policy changes into account.  
Regarding net exports, in all countries, the total effects of a simultaneous fall in profit 
share is lower compared to an isolated change of the profit share. A fall in the profit share by 
1% point leads to an improvement of the trade balance in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden.    
Regarding the effect of a rise in public spending table G2 shows that the effects on private 
investment are strongly positive in all countries with values ranging between 0.429%-points 
(UK) and 2.97-points (Finland). Overall, a 1% point increase in public spending leads to an 
increase in private investment of 0.92%-points. Again the effect is stronger when fiscal policy 
is implemented in coordination as opposed to in isolation. The effects on the trade balance are 
still negative in Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and the UK; 
however the negative effect on trade balance is now smaller in absolute value because of the 
cross border spill over effects of higher demand on exports.  
Finally, we analyse the effects of a simultaneous change in implicit tax rates on capital and 
labour income on investment. As expected, a simultaneous 1% point increase in ITR on 
capital leads to slightly stronger negative effect on private investment in all countries with 
values ranging between 0.03%-points (UK) and 0.18%-points (NL), compared to a change in 
isolation. On average, private investment declines by 0.08% points. In contrast, a 
simultaneous 1% point fall in ITR on labour income leads to stronger positive effects on 
private investment due to increased consumption and hence investment demand. The values 
range between 0.17%-points (Italy) and 0.96%-points (Finland) and are larger compared to an 
isolated change in ITR on labour income.   
 
                                                 
31
 We do not model the impact of a change in ITR on capital and labour income on net exports. Also, for 
modelling the impact of G on NX we only use the M and W matrices as there are only income effects following 
an increase in public spending.  
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5.3. Robustness checks 
We have run a series of robustness checks for our consumption and investment function. 
For our consumption function32 we have checked the robustness of our results using different 
sample sizes (1960-2007; 1980-2007; 1980-2012). Our results are robust for the EU14 
countries, except for Spain. Here, we did either find insignificant or perverse effects of net 
profit income on consumption for the full sample, which is at odds with our previous 
estimations and the empirical literature presented in Onaran and Obst (2016). Hence, we have 
kept the full sample size for all EU14 countries, but reduced it to the pre-crisis period for 
Spain. 
Appendix E illustrates the tables for different investment functions we have estimated to 
test the robustness of our results. Table E1 presents the results for the private investment 
specification, which includes after-tax profit share        , total GDP ( ) and the real long-
term interest rate ( ). In comparison to our estimations of the investment function in Onaran 
and Obst (2016) (from now on called ‘benchmark specification’) the results are robust. We 
have a statistically significant profit marginal in half of the EU14 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden. In all countries, private GDP has strong and 
significant accelerator effects. The profitability effect is significantly larger in the Netherlands 
with 0.26%-points (0.08%-points in benchmark specification) as well as in Belgium with 
0.55%-points (0.21%-points in benchmark specification) and France with 0.25%-points 
(0.10%-points). However, we find no statistically significant effects in Denmark (0.17%-
points in benchmark specification).  
Table E2 presents the effects on private investment when G is integrated in the 
specification as moving sum of 3 years. As can be seen, total government expenditure is 
significant in 6 countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. We find positive effects in Finland, Netherlands, and Sweden. We find negative 
effects on private investment in Belgium, France and the UK. However, when we estimated a 
reduced sample size (1960-2007) only the positive government expenditure effects in Finland, 
Netherlands and Sweden remain. In Belgium, France and UK the effects become statistically 
insignificant and are hence not robust.  
Table E3 shows the results for private investment based on equation (2’) where I is a 
function of public investment (  ), government spending in social infrastructure (  ) and other 
                                                 
32
 Since our tax data for ITR on capital and labour income) comes from different data sources we have also 
checked correlations between before tax and after tax profit share and wage share as well as before tax and after 
tax adjusted profits and wages to check for the validity of our calculated after-tax wage and profit bill as well as 
after-tax profit share.  
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government spending (  ), after-tax profit share (       ), private GDP (  ) and public 
debt as a ratio to GDP (   ).33 
The results mostly confirm our theoretical expectations for different types of government 
expenditure. In alignment with the expected positive demand and additional crowding in 
effects of public investment,    shows indeed positive effects in the short run as well as in the 
long run in 8 countries. However, we also find significant negative effects in three countries 
(Belgium, France and Spain). Regarding our variables    and    our theoretical assumptions 
are also visible in the data. We find positive effects in 5 countries for both government 
spending categories. On average, investment in social infrastructure shows larger effects 
compared to other government spending where the positive effects (elasticities) are smaller. 
This result seems plausible since we expect that other government spending primarily 
increases output through multiplier effects, but does not lead to additional crowding in effects 
enhancing private investment such as investment in social infrastructure does.  
However, other government spending also shows large effects in the Netherlands. In the 
UK other government spending has a negative impact. In Greece investment in social 
infrastructure has a negative impact34. 
There is a group of countries that have strong and significant positive effects of different 
types of government expenditure on private investment including Austria, Finland, Greece, 
Netherlands, and Sweden. For instance in Austria both    and    have positive effects on 
private investment. In Greece, both    and    have positive effects but    has a negative 
effect. 
There is another group of countries with mixed effects of government expenditure: 
Belgium, France, Spain and the UK. In Belgium, surprisingly,    has a negative effect in the 
long as well as in the short run. However,    has a strong and significant positive effect in the 
long run. In the UK,    has the expected positive and significant effects, however,    has a 
negative effect on private investment. In an alternative long-run specification for the UK,    
and    are insignificant but    has a strong positive and significant effect. However, the effect 
of    is not robust across specifications.  
                                                 
33
 Theoretically this specification is closest to our preferred investment specification outlined in section 3. 
However, due to the short sample size and multicollinearity issues we report it as a robustness check only. 
Nevertheless, the results for different government expenditure categories confirm and further explain our 
estimated effects of total G on private investment (table 2 in section 4).  
34
 We have run a robustness check with reduced sample size (1960-2007) and the results are overall robust. Only 
in Denmark Gc has become insignificant and in Greece Ig has become insignificant.  
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Moreover, we estimated the effects of each variable (        ) on excess demand/Y, the 
multiplier effects and how equilibrium AD changes following a 1% point increase in isolation 
as well as following a simultaneous change. The results are presented in table F5 in Appendix 
F. In the first scenario, all countries increase public investment by 1% point. The total effects 
on AD are significantly positive for all countries. Following an isolated 1% point increase in 
   equilibrium AD increases by 1% in Belgium or 5.10% in Greece, as a ratio to GDP 
(Column C). Similarly, in the second scenario, where all countries increase government 
spending in social infrastructure (Column G), the effects are strongly positive on equilibrium 
AD ranging between 1.07% (Ireland) and 3.41% (Finland). Moreover, in the third scenario, 
where all countries increase other government spending the multiplier effects are large 
leading to an increase in equilibrium AD (Column K) with values ranging between 1.08% 
(Belgium) and 6.25% (France).  
Following a simultaneous rise in    by 1%-point as a ratio to GDP, EU15 GDP would increase 
by 3.71%; following a simultaneous change in    it increases by 3.80% and following a 
simultaneous rise in    it increases by 5.15%. 
 
6. Policy mix scenarios for egalitarian growth and sustainable fiscal policies    
In this section, we set out an alternative scenario of a policy mix that includes 4 policies 
implemented simultaneously in each country: (a) a pro-labour wages policy and expansionary 
fiscal policy based on 1%-point increase in the pre-tax wage share and a 1%-point increase in 
public spending; (b) a progressive tax policy based on a 1%-point fall in the tax rate on 
wages; and a 1%-point increase in the tax rate on profits, and (c) a policy mix that combines 
the effects of all 4 policies, i.e. pro-labour pre-distribution and redistribution and fiscal 
expansion. See Appendix F for details.  
Table 9 (Column A) shows that a combined increase in the wage share and government 
expenditure has large positive effects on equilibrium AD of each national economy with 
values ranging between 2.29% (Ireland) and 13.67% (Finland). Overall, EU15 GDP would 
increase by 5.56%.  
Column B presents the effects of a more progressive tax policy on equilibrium AD in each 
national economy. The positive effects of a fall in ITR on labour income on consumption 
outweigh the negative effects of a rise in ITR on capital income on private investment as well 
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as consumption. All countries experience positive effects with values ranging between 0.52% 
in Ireland and 3.22% in Spain35. Overall, EU15 GDP increases by 1.43%.  
Finally, we combine the 4 policy changes in income distribution, public spending, and 
taxation. The effects of this policy mix are strongest in Finland (11.71%), Greece (14.47%) 
and Spain (15.49%). These countries had high differences in MPC, no significant effect of 
profit share but significant government expenditure effects on private investment. Overall, 
EU15 GDP increases by 6.63% illustrating the importance of a more comprehensive policy 
mix of wage, taxation and investment policies.  
Moreover, we estimate the total effect of a combined policy mix on investment. (Column 
D in table 9). Following a simultaneous and combined change in wage and fiscal policies 
private investment increases in all countries. Hence, despite negative effects coming from an 
increase in ITR on capital the strong the positive effects coming from a fall in ITR on wages, 
as well as a fall in the profit share and an increase in public spending lead to an average 
increase in private investment by 1.46%-points, as a ratio to GDP. The effects are strongest in 
countries with significant effect of G on I; for instance       increases by 2.06%-points in 
Austria or 4.19%-points in Finland. The effects are weaker in countries without significant 
effect of G on I but with significant negative effect of public debt such as in Belgium (0.82%-
points) or in the UK (0.85%-points).  
Table 9 
Next, we estimate the impact of each fiscal policy change on the budget balance (     as 
a ratio to GDP. Table 10 outlines the results when there is a simultaneous change in fiscal 
policy in all countries. A 1% point simultaneous fall in the profit share leads to an 
improvement in the budget balance due to the fact that 14 EU countries are wage-led and 
hence an increase in the wage share has positive effects on GDP growth. The effects range 
from 0.007%-points (Greece) to 0.62%-points (Spain). An increase in public spending by 1% 
point, however, leads to a deterioration of the budget balance with effects ranging from -
0.02%-points (Finland) and -0.98% points (Greece). Surprisingly, expansionary fiscal policy 
in Spain is self-sustaining indicated by a positive effect in Spain (0.36%-points) due to strong 
multiplier effects.   
A 1% point simultaneous increase in taxation on capital income has positive effect on the 
budget balance. The improvement ranges between 0.18%-points in the Netherlands and 
0.36%-points in Greece. However, the effects of a 1% point fall in the implicit tax rate on 
                                                 
35
 Spain has the largest MPC of -0.858 and hence experiences a significant increase in consumption when 
taxation on wages is reduced.  
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wages leads to an even larger improvement in the budget balance with effects ranging 
between 0.55%-points in Greece and 1.21%-points in Spain. Overall, when we combine the 4 
policies there is an improvement in the budget balance in all countries except in Greece and 
Ireland. Here, the budget balance deteriorates slightly by -0.06%-points and -0.05%-points 
respectively. On average, however, the budget balance in the EU15 countries improves by 
0.84% points. 
Table 10 
Finally, we analyse to what extent a wage stimulus in the EU15 countries would exert 
inflationary pressures. Table F4 in Appendix F shows the effects for an isolated as well as 
simultaneous 1% increase in the wage share on inflation in the EU15 countries.  Annual 
inflation increases by roughly 1.3% following an isolated increase and by 1.5% following a 
simultaneous 1% point increase in the wage share. As a result, the majority of the countries 
would experience inflation rates well below the ECB target inflation rate (2%).  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper developed a multi-country Post-Kaleckian model augmented by a government 
sector. We introduced public spending and taxes on consumption, labour and capital in a 
demand-led growth model and estimated it for the EU15 countries.  
The empirical analysis in this paper has shown that a simultaneous decline in the wage 
share in a highly integrated European economy leads to a decline in growth. There is room to 
stimulate demand in an economic climate of sluggish growth: a 1% simultaneous increase in 
the wage share at the European model could lead to a 1.45% increase in EU15 GDP. 
The negative effects of a fall in the wage share on consumption overpower the positive 
effects on investment in 14 European countries. When considering after-tax income, the 
difference in MPC is significantly larger in the majority of the EU15 countries, compared to 
the previous empirical literature. Moreover, when firms consider after-tax profits, the general 
breakdown of the profit-investment nexus becomes even more apparent. Hence, domestic 
demand is clearly wage-led in the EU15. Interestingly, integrating the foreign sector does not 
lead to a regime shift in the EU15 since domestic demand is strongly wage-led. Therefore, in 
isolation, we find 14 countries to be wage led and 1 country to be profit-led.  
We find evidence for both crowding in and (financial) crowding out effects of fiscal 
variables on private investment. On the one hand, government expenditure enhances private 
investment in 9 EU countries, which presents the majority of our sample. On the other hand, 
public debt has a negative effect on private investment in 8 countries. However, the negative 
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effects of public debt are small compared to the positive effects of public spending, indicating 
that private investment is overall positively affected by fiscal expansion. 
When we disaggregate public spending into three parts the empirical results confirm our 
theoretical expectations for different types of government expenditure. Public investment has 
significant positive effects on private investment in the majority of the EU15 countries. 
Moreover, both public spending in social infrastructure and other government spending have 
significant positive effects in 5 countries each. These results are very important from an 
economic policy making perspective. However, due to data limitations and econometric issues 
(e.g. multicollinearity) these results are at best only indicative and require further research in 
the future. 
Integrating public spending and public debt into the model increases the multiplier (on 
average) compared to the multipliers estimated in the private sector open economy model in 
the previous empirical literature. Moreover, the multipliers related to an increase in public 
spending are larger on average than multipliers related to a change in income distribution 
since they integrate impacts of public debt and taxation as well.  
As expected, all multiplier effects are much stronger when policies are implemented 
simultaneously. A combined and simultaneous change of a 1% increase in the pre-tax wage 
share and 1% increase in public spending leads to a significant increase of 5.56% in the EU15 
GDP and hence indicates the importance of a comprehensive policy mix that combines wage-
led and public investment policies in Europe, The impact of egalitarian wage policies are 
positive but small; however when mixed with the much stronger impact of fiscal expansion, 
the overall stimulus is much more effective in achieving both targets of income equality and 
strong job creation, 
The hypothesis that a more progressive tax system potentially stimulates demand (e.g. 
through national multiplier effects) is confirmed in our empirical estimations. A redistributive 
policy of a 1% point fall in ITR on labour income and a simultaneous 1% point increase in 
ITR on capital income leads to an increase in EU15 GDP of 1.43%, as a ratio to GDP. The 
positive effects of a reduction of the tax rate on wages significantly induce consumption and 
thus outweigh the negative effects on investment spending (and consumption demand) due to 
an increase of taxation on profit income.  
Finally we estimated the impact of a combined policy mix that includes pre-distribution, 
redistribution and public spending based on a 1% point increase in the wage share, a 1% point 
increase in public spending, a 1% increase in ITR on capital income, and a 1% fall in ITR on 
labour income in all countries. As expected, a combined policy mix that takes into account 
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wage policy, public spending, and progressive taxation leads to much stronger growth effects 
and increases EU15 GDP by 6.63%, as a ratio to GDP.  
This paper also analysed the impact of expansionary fiscal policy on budget balance. A 
targeted public spending policy, together with a more progressive tax policy and a pro-labour 
wage policy, leads to an improvement in the budget balance in the majority of the EU15 
countries. In these countries the positive accelerator and multiplier effects on demand and 
growth lead to a rise in taxes that outweighs the adverse effects of higher government 
spending on the budget balance. Following a simultaneous change in income and fiscal policy 
only Greece and Ireland experience a negligible deterioration of the budget balance. On 
average, the budget balance improves by 0.84% points in the EU15 countries. Hence, 
expansionary fiscal policy is sustainable when wage and public spending policies are 
combined with progressive tax policy; the impact is stronger when these policies are 
implemented in a coordinated fashion across Europe due to strong positive spill over effects 
on demand. 
As an outcome of a wage-led recovery scenario (e.g. wage share increasing by 1% point), 
the majority of the countries would experience increasing inflation rates but well below the 
ECB target inflation rate of 2%. In fact, the results indicate that a wage stimulus in the EU15 
would help to keep the European economy away from deflation.  
Extending the post-Kaleckian private sector open economy model by taxes on capital and 
labour has shown to increase the likelihood of a wage-led economic regime. Integrating 
public spending increases the multiplier effects and amplifies the wage-led outcome. Hence, 
the analysis of this paper highlights the importance to link fiscal policy with policies targeting 
a more equal income distribution.  
Combining egalitarian labour market and tax policies with public spending policies are 
important not only for achieving higher growth, investment and sustainable debt levels but 
also for other important social targets, such as lowering carbon emissions via green 
investments or improving gender equality via public spending in social infrastructure. 
Similarly, public investment policies are key to achieving structural change, higher 
productivity in tradable sectors and keeping trade balance under control while still managing 
an egalitarian economic model.   
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Table 1. Consumption: dependent variable           
 
Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR 
= Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L=Luxemburg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom  
DW R
2
Sample
A 0.010 0.113 0.588 2.073 0.544 1971-2012
(3.760) *** (3.792) *** (5.950) ***
B 0.015 0.094 0.289 1.638 0.339 1971-2012
(5.795) *** (2.152) ** (4.071) ***
DK 0.007 0.087 0.519 1.668 0.211 1971-2011
(1.434) (1.987) ** (3.089) ***
FIN 0.017 0.106 0.439 1.814 0.553 1966-2012
(5.386) *** (4.455) *** (6.445) ***
F 0.014 0.086 0.515 1.608 0.535 1971-2012
(6.307) *** (3.100) *** (5.802) ***
D 0.005 0.067 0.381 0.419 1.810 0.634 1966-2012
(1.576) (1.731) * (3.711) .*** (3.726) ***
GR 0.018 0.190 0.399 0.375 1.957 0.735 1972-2013
(3.396) *** (3.902) *** (5.619) *** 2.102 **
IRL 0.011 0.129 0.457 1.989 0.472 1971-2012
(2.036) ** (3.110) *** (5.058) ***
I 0.014 0.112 0.311 0.568 1.890 0.657 1972-2012
(2.867) ** (4.810) *** (3.596) *** 3.855 ***
L 0.016 0.103 0.350 1.741 0.350 1961-2013
(4.087) *** (3.451) *** (4.920) ***
NL 0.000 0.095 0.338 0.519 1.921 0.668 1971-2012
-(0.040) (3.340) *** (3.673) *** (4.878) ***
P 0.018 0.089 0.574 1.821 0.591 1971-2012
(4.495) *** (5.287) *** (6.867) ***
E 0.009 0.072 0.753 2.449 0.847 1961-2007
(3.510) *** (2.136) ** (15.132) ***
S 0.010 0.019 0.236 0.258 1.865 0.282 1962-2012
(2.640) ** (0.666) (2.701) *** 1.924 *
UK 0.011 0.072 0.626 0.310 2.038 0.682 1967-2012
(3.268) *** (4.288) *** (6.761) *** (2.051) **
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Table 2. Private investment: dependent variable         with government expenditures ( ) 
 
Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR 
= Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L=Luxemburg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
DW R
2
Sample
A -0.017 0.138 1.285 0.630 -0.168 1.935 0.570 1971-2013
-(1.415) (1.433) (4.131) *** 1.724 * -1.612
B -0.004 0.397 1.429 -0.393 1.607 0.640 1970-2012
-(0.402) 2.667 *** (5.137) *** -2.766 ***
DK 0.075 0.064 2.342 2.245 0.754 1961-2012
(0.855) 1.142 (10.928) ***
FIN -0.510 -0.027 1.344 -0.140 -0.231 -0.483 0.265 0.336 -0.105 1.884 0.915 1972-2012
-(3.811) *** -0.394 (6.958) *** -2.436 ** -4.213 *** -5.203 *** 3.081 *** 3.925 *** -4.063 ***
F 0.017 0.177 1.390 -0.528 -0.335 1.975 0.912 1978-2013
(2.638) *** (3.002) *** (9.538) *** -(3.076) *** -5.365 ***
D -0.364 0.0002 1.642 0.187 0.327 -0.217 0.217 2.001 0.792 1962-2012
-(3.457) *** (0.002) (10.578) *** 2.228 ** 1.808 * -2.974 * 3.397 ***
GR 0.033 0.084 1.696 0.498 -0.259 2.090 0.615 1961-2013
(0.585) (1.613) (7.160) *** 1.829 * -(1.648) *
IRL 0.184 0.171 0.575 -0.440 -0.445 0.161 0.280 -0.124 1.721 0.629 1971-2012
(1.038) (0.970) 1.339 -4.148 *** -3.262 * 1.958 * 1.915 * -3.007 ***
I -0.018 0.129 1.374 0.333 1.924 0.640 1962-2012
-(2.251) ** (1.722) * (8.303) *** (2.413) **
L -0.029 0.160 1.728 2.410 0.273 1963-2013
-(1.420) (0.675) (4.172) ***
NL -0.033 0.254 1.549 0.538 1.802 0.578 1962-2013
-(2.979) *** 2.644 *** (7.732) *** 1.864 *
P -1.979 -0.069 2.424 0.717 0.588 -0.622 0.993 -0.179 2.074 0.728 1974-2012
-(3.969) *** -(1.398) (6.286) *** 1.838 * 1.965 ** -3.732 ** 3.684 *** -2.510 **
E -1.301 0.094 2.565 0.408 -0.231 -0.359 0.500 0.398 1.770 0.939 1972-2013
-(2.528) ** (1.171) (13.832) *** 2.518 ** -3.408 *** -3.792 ** 3.540 *** (2.291) **
S 0.164 0.152 1.617 1.235 -0.206 1.629 0.772 1971-2013
(1.869) * (2.206) ** (7.229) *** 2.465 ** -2.593 ***
UK -0.659 0.053 1.697 -0.203 -0.388 0.403 2.173 0.785 1972-2012
-(2.377) ** (1.321) (9.743) *** -2.392 ** -(3.680) ** (3.542) ***
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Table 3. Price deflator: dependent variable          
 
Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR 
= Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L=Luxemburg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
DW R
2
Sample
A 0.005 0.146 0.453 0.286 1.920 0.851 1962-2013
(2.433) ** (3.715) *** (5.320) *** (4.952) ***
B 0.019 0.158 0.129 0.214 0.573 2.139 0.813 1962-2013
(3.985) *** (6.721) *** (4.197) *** (2.456) *** (3.662) ***
DK 0.008 0.183 0.465 0.249 2.029 0.865 1962-2013
(2.423) ** (5.266) *** (4.037) *** (2.698) ***
FIN 0.009 0.236 0.198 0.416 0.742 1.966 0.860 1966-2012
(2.299) ** (5.712) *** (2.128) ** (5.399) *** (2.336) **
F 0.004 0.094 0.633 0.194 1.795 0.907 1962-2013
(1.718) * (3.580) *** (4.635) *** (1.624) *
D 0.017 0.032 0.366 0.697 2.105 0.841 1962-2013
(4.498) *** (1.635) * (7.781) *** (8.452) ***
GR 0.019 0.462 0.423 0.000 1.758 0.810 1962-2013
(2.870) *** (6.435) *** (5.932) ***
IRL 0.030 0.235 0.334 1.003 0.404 2.120 0.753 1971-2012
(2.418) ** (2.872) *** (2.512) ** (2.309) ** (2.727) ***
I 0.028 0.084 0.445 0.909 0.902 2.404 0.958 1971-2012
(1.333) (4.292) *** 8.934 *** (3.251) *** (11.479) ***
L 0.024 0.523 -0.482 0.345 1.651 0.479 1962-2013
(4.180) *** (5.076) *** -(3.605) *** (3.284) ***
NL 0.007 0.152 0.448 0.255 1.997 0.801 1962-2013
(2.492) ** (4.599) *** (3.656) *** (2.687) ***
P 0.005 0.206 0.199 0.668 0.768 1.645 0.921 1981-2012
(0.982) (3.418) *** (3.584) *** (9.214) *** (1.870) *
E 0.025 0.078 0.430 0.640 0.857 2.257 0.944 1981-2012
(1.971) ** (2.700) *** (5.281) *** (2.335) ** (7.580) ***
S 0.011 0.156 0.225 0.407 0.628 1.590 0.846 1971-2012
(3.032) *** (3.915) *** (5.372) *** (6.697) *** (2.553) **
UK 0.002 0.036 0.380 0.558 0.565 2.136 0.945 1966-2012
(0.769) (1.206) (7.491) *** (12.119) *** (1.708) *
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Table 4. Export price deflator: dependent variable           
 
Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR 
= Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L=Luxemburg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
DW R
2
Sample
A 0.002 0.616 0.152 2.339 0.867 1961-2013
(1.060) (15.385) *** (3.490) ***
B 0.001 0.789 0.096 2.037 0.949 1961-2013
(0.674) (26.133) *** (1.920) *
DK 1.250 0.728 0.445 -0.630 0.384 0.213 1.989 0.922 1966-2012
(3.965) *** (18.834) *** (1.661) * -(4.344) *** (4.262) *** (3.904) ***
FIN -0.003 0.776 0.185 1.569 0.879 1961-2013
-(0.811) (15.279) *** (2.612) ***
F -0.002 0.528 0.142 0.248 1.875 0.956 1962-2013
-(1.025) (21.465) *** (3.074) *** (4.124) ***
D 0.636 0.378 0.193 0.407 -0.267 0.133 0.089 0.325 1.778 0.926 1966-2012
(2.543) *** (13.884) *** (3.118) *** (3.013) *** -(3.281) * (3.683) *** (2.157) ** (3.207) ***
GR 1.115 0.828 0.154 -0.511 0.297 0.192 1.880 0.914 1961-2013
(3.237) *** (12.355) *** (1.631) * -(4.341) *** (3.536) *** (3.250) ***
IRL 0.708 0.171 2.004 0.810 1961-2013
(0.009) (10.398) *** (1.946) *
I -0.001 0.530 0.213 0.202 0.705 -0.470 2.028 0.962 1966-2012
-(0.240) (33.334) *** (3.370) *** (2.886) *** (1.757) * -(3.515) ***
L 0.024 -0.001 0.322 1.800 0.076 1962-2013
(2.389) ** -(0.006) (1.704) *
NL 0.002 0.229 0.370 2.008 0.171 1962-2013
(0.251) (1.877) * (1.823) *
P 0.211 0.666 -0.247 0.151 -0.235 -0.486 0.427 0.044 2.192 0.956 1966-2013
(1.617) (15.640) *** -(2.640) *** (1.296) -(3.867) *** -(6.498) *** (7.425) *** (1.937) *
E 0.011 0.407 0.130 0.320 0.482 1.593 0.881 1962-2013
(1.071) (9.092) *** (1.329) (3.712) *** (3.905) ***
S -0.002 0.716 0.172 1.928 0.877 1961-2013
-(0.616) (16.126) *** (2.509) ***
UK 0.558 0.577 0.136 -0.486 0.377 0.101 1.667 0.928 1966-2012
(3.051) *** (13.998) *** (2.084) ** -(4.725) *** (4.975) *** (3.172) ***
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Table 5. Exports: dependent variable         
 
Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR 
= Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L=Luxemburg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
DW R
2 Sample
A -0.028 -1.728 2.314 1.778 0.676 1961-2013
-(2.813) *** -(5.717) *** (9.008) ***
B -0.029 -0.185 2.315 1.876 0.669 1961-2013
-(3.264) *** -(0.728) (10.045) ***
DK -0.004 -0.627 1.540 1.718 0.472 1961-2013
-(0.483) -(3.581) *** (6.445) ***
FIN -0.068 -0.576 3.428 0.430 2.121 0.486 1962-2013
-(3.074) *** -(2.003) ** (6.415) *** (3.077) ***
F -0.020 -0.439 2.155 0.158 0.371 2.194 0.725 1962-2013
-(1.718) * -(3.075) *** (7.689) *** (1.665) * (2.684) ***
D -0.017 -0.379 2.136 2.022 0.372 1962-2013
-(1.145) -(1.876) * (5.376) ***
GR -0.037 -0.729 2.917 1.664 0.305 1962-2013
-(1.342) -(1.805) * (3.968) ***
IRL 0.043 -0.178 1.041 0.351 1.896 0.189 1962-2013
(2.223) ** -(0.903) (2.155) ** (2.608) ***
I -0.053 -0.307 3.006 1.966 0.586 1962-2013
-(3.811) *** -(1.994) ** (8.285) ***
L -0.033 0.187 2.688 0.317 2.102 0.388 1963-2013
-(1.621) (0.789) (4.893) *** (2.064) **
NL -0.027 -0.290 2.445 0.559 2.194 0.725 1962-2013
-(2.681) *** -(1.318) (10.955) *** (4.761) ***
P -0.017 0.316 2.409 0.330 1.816 0.420 1963-2013
-(0.799) (1.354) (4.401) *** (2.383) **
E -0.012 -0.277 2.448 1.664 0.426 1961-2013
-(0.815) -(2.214) ** (6.029) ***
S -0.045 -0.508 2.715 0.497 2.037 0.575 1962-2013
-(3.009) *** -(2.915) *** (7.877) *** (3.832) ***
UK 0.001 -0.518 1.174 1.562 0.453 1961-2013
(0.152) -(3.708) *** (4.696) ***
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Table 6. Imports: dependent variable         
 
Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR 
= Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L=Luxemburg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
 
DW R
2 Sample
A -0.001 0.341 1.702 2.256 0.688 1962-2013
-0.091 1.985 ** 8.983 ***
B 0.003 0.371 -0.291 1.293 0.584 0.299 2.111 0.740 1962-2013
0.436 3.794 *** -2.355 ** 7.379 *** 2.373 ** 1.757 *
DK 0.014 0.060 1.510 2.050 0.637 1961-2013
2.319 ** 0.498 8.823 ***
FIN 0.003 0.135 1.496 2.342 0.760 1962-2013
0.474 1.273 12.448 ***
F 0.014 0.169 -0.241 2.013 1.831 0.823 1962-2013
2.486 ** 2.388 ** -3.460 *** 11.838 ***
D 0.012 0.072 1.504 0.284 1.548 0.661 1962-2013
1.699 * 0.763 9.087 *** 1.657 *
GR 0.001 0.103 1.038 0.442 1.752 0.572 1962-2013
0.067 0.553 5.743 *** 2.497 **
IRL -0.493 0.401 0.632 0.479 0.270 0.320 -0.206 0.307 1.859 0.678 1962-2013
-3.176 *** 3.925 *** 3.503 *** 2.248 ** 1.835 * 2.570 ** -3.265 * 3.246 ***
I -0.006 0.210 1.983 2.182 0.689 1961-2013
-0.710 2.329 ** 10.521 ***
L 0.010 -0.025 1.230 2.146 0.490 1961-2013
1.107 -0.168 6.925 ***
NL -0.155 0.018 0.139 1.187 2.036 0.720 1962-2013
-1.064 3.951 *** 1.821 * 9.365 ***
P -4.574 1.221 1.816 0.726 -0.314 -1.051 0.597 1.816 0.896 1.828 0.716 1961-2013
-4.817 *** 3.683 *** 6.464 *** 2.986 *** -2.598 *** -7.969 *** 3.583 *** 6.464 *** 6.409 ***
E 0.001 0.244 2.220 1.602 0.652 1962-2013
0.096 2.271 ** 8.222 ***
S -2.760 1.449 0.526 -0.481 0.223 0.621 0.202 1.971 0.763 1961-2013
-5.148 *** 11.206 *** 1.690 * -5.104 *** 4.262 *** 4.521 *** 3.951 ***
UK -3.542 0.051 1.263 0.788 -0.541 0.787 0.220 2.119 0.782 1962-2013
-4.484 *** 0.826 10.153 *** 4.517 *** -4.633 *** 4.720 *** 2.806
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Table 7. The effects of a 1%-point increase in the profit share 
 
Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR 
= Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L=Luxemburg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP. 
 
 
The effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share in only one country on: 
C/Y I/Y X/Y M/Y NX/Y
Private excess 
demand 
/ Y Multiplier
% Change in 
aggregate demand 
(F*G)
The effect of a simultanous 1%-point increase 
in the profit share on % change 
in aggregate demand 
A B C D E(C-D) F(A+B+E) G H I
A -0.534 0.000 0.234 -0.168 0.402 -0.132 2.048 -0.271 -1.547
B -0.165 0.335 0.000 -0.057 0.057 0.226 1.044 0.236 -0.392
DK -0.424 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.180 -0.243 2.191 -0.533 -1.199
FIN -0.369 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.074 -0.295 2.471 -0.729 -1.749
F -0.463 0.160 0.062 -0.036 0.098 -0.205 2.383 -0.489 -0.926
D -0.689 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.063 -0.626 2.256 -1.413 -1.810
GR -0.572 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.099 -0.473 5.055 -2.391 -3.410
IRL -0.335 0.000 0.000 -0.140 0.140 -0.195 1.062 -0.207 -0.697
I -0.207 0.086 0.037 -0.043 0.080 -0.042 1.718 -0.071 -0.395
L -0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.153 0.560 -0.086 -0.919
NL -0.367 0.170 0.000 -0.066 0.066 -0.131 2.760 -0.361 -1.683
P -0.443 0.000 0.000 -0.317 0.317 -0.126 2.520 -0.318 -0.917
E -0.858 0.000 0.034 -0.039 0.074 -0.784 3.990 -3.128 -3.800
S -0.535 0.120 0.063 -0.137 0.200 -0.215 2.582 -0.554 -1.749
UK -0.547 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.070 -0.477 2.065 -0.984 -1.253
EU15 GDP * -1.446
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Table 8. Effects of changes in public spending, taxes on capital and labour on demand  
 
Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR 
= Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L=Luxemburg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP. See Appendix B for details. 
Excess 
Demand 
/ Y Multiplier 
% change in 
aggregate 
demand 
(A*B)
The effects of a 
simultaneous 1%-point 
increase in public spending 
on % change in aggregate 
demand
Excess 
Demand 
/ Y Multiplier
% change in 
aggregate 
demand 
(E*F)
The effects of a 
simultaneous 1%-point 
increase in tr 
on % change in 
aggregate demand
Excess 
Demand 
/ Y Multiplier
% change in 
aggregate 
demand  
(I*J)
The effects of a 
simultaneous 1%-point 
increase in tw 
on % change in 
aggregate demand
A B C D E F G H I J K L
A 1,508 2,048 3,087 4,734 -0,087 2,048 -0,177 -0,335 0,512 2,048 1,049 1,825
B 0,517 1,185 0,612 2,238 -0,173 1,153 -0,199 -0,348 0,257 1,153 0,296 1,038
DK 1,000 2,191 2,191 3,431 -0,065 2,191 -0,142 -0,261 0,407 2,191 0,892 1,475
FIN 1,211 4,682 5,669 10,038 -0,071 3,357 -0,239 -0,543 0,362 3,357 1,215 2,708
F 0,497 3,395 1,689 2,951 -0,120 2,988 -0,359 -0,455 0,450 2,988 1,343 1,839
D 1,068 2,256 2,409 3,382 -0,090 2,256 -0,202 -0,297 0,581 2,256 1,311 1,754
GR 1,396 5,055 7,059 9,230 -0,131 5,055 -0,662 -0,868 0,337 5,055 1,703 2,737
IRL 0,826 1,176 0,971 1,652 -0,105 1,140 -0,120 -0,183 0,347 1,140 0,395 0,705
I 1,000 1,718 1,718 2,659 -0,126 1,718 -0,216 -0,303 0,279 1,718 0,479 0,932
L 1,000 0,560 0,560 2,758 -0,042 0,560 -0,023 -0,233 0,206 0,560 0,115 1,146
NL 1,340 2,760 3,699 6,936 -0,180 2,760 -0,498 -0,800 0,521 2,760 1,439 2,969
P 0,900 3,460 3,113 4,731 -0,072 3,187 -0,228 -0,371 0,460 3,187 1,465 2,164
E 1,413 4,680 6,615 8,367 -0,058 4,490 -0,259 -0,434 0,636 4,490 2,857 3,655
S 1,208 3,239 3,912 6,704 -0,054 2,938 -0,158 -0,404 0,280 2,938 0,822 2,033
UK 0,637 2,330 1,485 2,089 -0,075 2,238 -0,168 -0,223 0,491 2,238 1,099 1,360
EU15 GDP* 3,82 -0,36 1,79
Increase in ITR on capital income by 1% point
Policy 2
Decrease in ITR on labour income by 1% point
Policy 3Policy 1
Increase in public spending by 1% point
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Table 9. The effects of a simultaneous change of the policy mix in all countries 
 
Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR 
= Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom. 
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP. 
** Combines both policy mixes of column A and column B - A 1% point fall in profit share; a 1% point increase in public spending; a 1% point fall in ITR on labour income; and 
a 1% increase in ITR on capital income (see Appendix C for details). 
The effect of a simultaneous 1% 
point fall in profit share and a 
1% increase in public spending 
on equilibrium aggregate 
demand of each national 
economy  ∆Y/Y
The effect of a simulteaneous 1% 
point fall in ITR on labour income 
and a 1% point increase in ITR on 
capital income on equilibrium 
aggregate demand of each national 
economy ∆Y/Y
Total European multiplier effect of a 
simultaneous combined change in income 
distribution, government expenditures and 
taxation on capital and labour income on 
equilibrium demand of each national economy 
∆Y/Y
Total European multiplier effect of a 
simulteanous combined change in income 
distribution, government expenditures and 
implicit tax rate on capital and labour income on 
private investment of each national economy 
∆I/Y
A B C** D**
A 6.41 1.49 7.75 2.06
B 2.81 0.69 3.28 0.82
DK 4.73 1.21 5.83 0.85
FIN 13.68 2.17 11.72 4.19
F 4.35 1.38 5.13 1.01
D 5.28 1.46 6.63 1.47
GR 12.82 1.87 14.48 3.34
IRL 2.29 0.52 2.68 1.61
I 3.25 0.63 3.78 0.57
L 3.85 0.91 4.56 0.69
NL 8.89 2.17 10.74 2.02
P 6.12 1.79 7.29 2.92
E 12.96 3.22 15.49 3.84
S 9.12 1.63 9.67 2.54
UK 3.55 1.14 4.49 0.85
EU15 GDP* 5.57 1.43 6.64 1.46
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Table 10. Total effects of a policy mix on budget balance following a simultaneous change in all countries 
 
 
1%-point 
fall in 
profit share
1%-point 
increase in 
public spending
1%-point increase in 
taxation on capital 
income
1%-point fall in 
taxation on wage 
income
Combined effect on 
budget balance
A B C D E
A 0.254 -0.222 0.219 0.900 1.150
B 0.046 -0.735 0.253 0.725 0.290
DK 0.192 -0.450 0.243 0.818 0.803
FIN 0.171 -0.017 0.228 0.874 1.257
F 0.154 -0.510 0.190 0.908 0.742
D 0.342 -0.362 0.257 0.932 1.168
GR 0.007 -0.981 0.358 0.554 -0.062
IRL 0.012 -0.972 0.303 0.602 -0.055
I 0.049 -0.673 0.290 0.702 0.367
L 0.050 -0.851 0.397 0.582 0.178
NL 0.208 -0.142 0.183 1.002 1.250
P 0.115 -0.406 0.227 0.911 0.847
E 0.617 0.359 0.227 1.209 2.412
S 0.114 -0.561 0.272 0.650 0.475
UK 0.119 -0.801 0.256 0.742 0.317
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP 0.839
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Appendix  
Appendix A. Data sources and definitions 
 
 
 
Symbol Variable name Definition Source/variable 
construction
Time period
C Private consumption 
(real)
Private final consumption expenditure at constant prices AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
D General government 
consolidated gross debt
Total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the 
year of the sector of general government
AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
DY General government 
debt-to-GDP
Ratio of gross debt at nominal value to nominal GDP DY =D /nominal Y 1960-2013
E Exchange rate Average of local currency per dollar, euro, and yen World Bank World 
Development 
1960-2013
G General government 
expenditures
G =G i +G c +I g 1970-2013
G c Collective consumption 
expenditure of general 
government
Expenditures for collective consumption (defence, justice, etc.) 
which benefit society as a whole, or large parts of society, and 
are often known as public goods and services
OECD, National 
Accounts (2016)
1970-2013
G ce General government 
consumption 
expenditure
General government consumption expenditure, consists of 
expenditure incurred by government in its production of non-
market final goods and services (except gross fixed capital 
formation) and market goods and services provided as social 
transfers in kind.
OECD, National 
Accounts (2016)
1970-2013
G i Individual consumption 
expenditure of general 
government
Expenditures for individual consumption (health care, housing, 
education, etc.), reflect expenditures incurred by government on 
behalf of an individual household. This category of expenditure is 
equal to social transfers in kind from government to 
households and so includes expenditure by government on 
market goods and services provided to households
OECD, National 
Accounts (2016)
1970-2013
G tc Total final consumption 
expenditure of general 
government
Final consumption expenditure of general government = 
individual consumption of general government + collective 
consumption of general government
AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
I Private investment (real) I =I t I ps 1960-2013
I g Gross capital formation 
expenditure of general 
government
Gross fixed capital formation consists of resident producers’ 
acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed assets during a given period 
plus certain additions to the value of non-pro-duced assets 
realised by the productive activity of producer or institutional 
units. Fixed assets are produced assets used in production for 
more than one year. 
I g = I t (1-I ps ) 1960-2013
I t Total investment (real) Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices, total economy AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
I pr Private investment 
(current prices)
Gross fixed capital formation at current prices, private sector AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
I ps Ratio of private to total 
investment
I ps =I pr /I tcurr 1960-2013
I tcurr Total investment 
(current prices)
Gross fixed capital formation at current prices, total economy AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
M Imports (real) Imports of goods and services at constant prices AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
M ji Imports from country j 
to country i
For each reporting country or group, all the trading partners are 
listed
IMF, Direction of 
Trade Statistics
1980-2012
P GDP deflator Price deflator gross domestic product at market prices AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
P m Import price deflator Price deflator imports of goods and services AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
P x Export price deflator Price deflator exports of goods and services AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
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(continued from the previous page) 
 
Notes:  
Government individual and collective consumption expenditure, real: OECD data is linked with AMECO 
online data on General Government Final Consumption Expenditure. We take the ratio of (        and 
(      ) respectively, and multiply with     ).   
ITR on consumption: For Germany and the UK we have calculated data from 1970 back to 1965 using growth 
rates based on consumption tax rates provided in the study by Mendoza et al. (1997). For Sweden from 1980 to 
1970. For Austria and Finland from 1980 back to 1965. Data starts only in 1980 in Greece, Portugal and Spain.  
ITR on labour: For Germany and the UK we have calculated data back from 1970 to 1965, for Austria and 
Finland from 1980 to 1970 and 1965 respectively, and for Sweden from 1980 to 1970 using growth rates based 
on labour tax rates provided by Mendoza et al. (1997). Data starts only in 1980 in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 
ITR on capital: For Luxembourg there is no data on ITR on capital. For Greece, data is not available after 
2007 and for Denmark 2012 is unavailable. For Austria and Sweden we have calculated data back from 1980 to 
1970, for Germany and the UK from 1970 to 1965, and for Finland from 1979 to 1965 using growth rates based 
on capital tax rates provided in the study by Mendoza et al. (1997). Data starts only in 1980 in Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain.  
Real gross capital formation of the general government, as a ratio to real GDP: Data for Austria starts in 1995 
and for Luxembourg in 1990. For Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden it starts in 
1970. We have extended the data back to 1960 in these countries assuming the ratio of general government 
gross capital formation to total investment stayed constant.  
 
Symbol Variable name Definition Source/variable 
construction
Time period
R Adjusted gross 
operating surplus (real)
R =πY f 1960-2013
rulc Real unit labour costs rulc =w s Y f /Y 1960-2013
t c Implicit tax rate on 
consumption (ITRC)
All consumption taxes divided by the final consumption 
expenditure of private households on the economic territory
European 
Commission, Eurostat
1965-2012
t r Implicit tax rate on 
capital (ITRK)
Revenue from all capital taxes divided by all potentially taxable 
business and capital income in the economy
European 
Commission, Eurostat
1965-2012
t w Implicit tax rate on 
labour (ITRL)
Sum of all direct and indirect taxes and employees and 
employers social contributions levied on employed labour income 
divided by the total compensation of employees working in the 
economic territory
European 
Commission, Eurostat
1965-2012
ulc Unit labour costs ulc =rulcP 1960-2013
W Adjusted compensation 
of employees (real)
W =w s Y f 1960-2013
w s Adjusted wage share Compensation per employee as percentage of GDP at factor 
cost per person employed
AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
X Exports (real) Exports of goods and services at constant prices AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
X ji Exports from country i 
to country j
For each reporting country or group, all the trading partners are 
listed
IMF, Direction of 
Trade Statistics
1980-2012
Y GDP in market prices 
(real)
Gross domestic product at 2010 market prices AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
Y f GDP at factor costs 
(real)
Gross domestic product at market prices minus taxes on 
production and imports, plus subsidies
AMECO (2016) 1960-2013
Y rw Foreign GDP (real) GDP of the rest of the world. Calculated from World GDP (in 
constant 2005 US$) - own GDP (in constant 2005 US$)
World Bank World 
Development 
1960-2013
π Adjusted profit share π =1-w s 1960-2013
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Appendix B. National and European Multiplier Effects 
 
Any change in private demand in country i will lead to a multiplier mechanism in that 
country, that is, it will affect consumption, investment, and imports. The total effect of a 
change in income distribution on equilibrium demand is given by: 
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Equation (B1) becomes: 
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The marginal effects are given by: 
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The term YGYNXYIYC 1  has to be positive for stability.  
 
Total European multiplier effects of a change in the income distribution in all countries on 
equilibrium aggregate demand of each national country are estimated in equation (16).The 
details of each matrix are given by: 
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Total effects of a change in government expenditures on equilibrium aggregate demand: 
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Therefore (B24) becomes: 
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Dividing (B25) by Y we get: 
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Total European multiplier effects of a change in government expenditures in all countries on 
equilibrium aggregate demand of each national country are estimated in equations (17) and 
(18). The details of each matrix are given by: 
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Total effects of a change in gross fixed capital formation of general government 36  on 
equilibrium aggregate demand: 
 
 (B27) 
 
where: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore (B27) becomes: 
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where: 
 
 
 
 
 
Dividing (B28) by Y we get: 
 
                                                 
36
 The same method is followed when estimating an exogenous increase in    and   . 
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 (B29) 
 
Total European multiplier effects of a change in gross fixed capital formation of general 
government expenditures in all countries on equilibrium aggregate demand of each national 
economy: 
 
 (B30) 
 
 (B31) 
 
where 
 
Total effects of a change in implicit tax rate on capital income on equilibrium aggregate 
demand: 
 
 (B32) 
 
where: 
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Therefore (B32) becomes: 
 (B33) 
 
where: 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Dividing (B33) by Y we get: 
   (B34) 
where: 
 
 
 or  
 
Total European multiplier effects of a change in implicit tax rate on capital income in all 
countries on equilibrium aggregate demand of each national economy are estimated in 
equation (19) and (20). The details of each matrix are given by: 
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Total effects of a change in implicit tax rate on labour income on equilibrium aggregate 
demand: 
 
 (B35) 
 
where: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore (B35) becomes: 
 (B36) 
 
where: 
  
 
 
 
Dividing (B36) by Y we get: 
 
 (B37) 
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where: 
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
  
 
Total European multiplier effects of a change in implicit tax rate on labour income in all 
countries on equilibrium aggregate demand of each national economy: 
 
 (B38) 
 
 (B39) 
where 
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Appendix C. Policy mix and further effects 
 
Total European multiplier effects of a change in income distributions and government 
expenditures in all countries on equilibrium aggregate demand of each national economy: 
 
    11515151151515
115








 dPdE
Y
dY  
115
1515
115
15151151515



 












Y
dY
W
Y
dY
HgdEg g   (C1) 
 
Total European multiplier effects of a change in implicit tax rate on capital income and 
implicit tax rate on labour income in all countries on equilibrium aggregate demand of each 
national economy: 
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Total European multiplier effects of a change in income distributions, government 
expenditures, implicit tax rate on capital income and implicit tax rate on labour income in all 
countries on equilibrium aggregate demand of each national economy: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in the income distribution on investment as follows: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in government expenditures on investment as 
follows: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in implicit tax rate on capital income on investment 
as follows: 
rrrr t
YD
YD
I
t
Y
Y
I
t
I
dt
dI












  
rrrr t
YD
YD
YI
t
Y*Y
Y
I
t
YI
dt
YId












  (C6) 
 
50 
 
We calculate the total effects of a change in implicit tax rate on labour income on investment 
as follows: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in income distributions, government expenditures, 
implicit tax rate on capital income and implicit tax rate on labour income on investment as in 
equation (24) in the main text.  
 
We calculate the total effects of a change in the income distribution on net exports as follows: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in government expenditures on net exports as 
follows: 
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Following Onaran and Obst (2016) we calculate the post-multiplier net export effects as 
 
 
 
 
      
   
 
      
    
 
 
 
              
   
 
   
             
 
 
 
 
     
   
 
     
    
 
 
 
  (C10) 
 
where 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
   
   
    
    
   
   
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
    
    
   
   
    
 
 
 
 
  
where      is 
  
  
   
 
  
  
   
  calculated as in equations (13) and (14) and     is calculated as 
    
  
  
. 
 
 







Y
Y
NXNX
d
dNX
 







Y*Y
Y
NXYNX
d
YdNX
51 
 
We calculate the total effects of a change in the income distribution on primary budget 
balance as follows: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in government expenditures on budget balance as 
follows: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in ITR on capital income on budget balance as 
follows: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in ITR on labour income on budget balance as 
follows: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in income distributions, government expenditures, 
ITR on capital income and ITR on labour income on budget balance as in equation (25) or as 
follows: 
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We calculate the total effects of a change in the income distribution on the percentage change 
in the domestic price level as follows: 
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  (C16) 
 
where: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Following Onaran and Obst (2016) we calculate the price effects of a simultaneous change in 
each country as: 
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Appendix D. 
 
Table D1. The marginal effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share on net exports 
  
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = 
Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
Sum
A B C D E (B*C*D) F G H I(-E*G*H/F) J K(A*B*J) L M(-K*G*L/F) I-M
A 0.524 2.099 0.152 -1.728 -0.551 0.599 0.874 0.291 0.234 0.341 0.375 0.306 -0.168 0.402
B 0.214 1.272 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.603 0.897 0.491 0.000 0.287 0.078 0.487 -0.057 0.057
DK 0.465 1.870 0.338 -0.627 -0.397 0.582 0.866 0.305 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.180
FIN 0.518 2.076 0.185 -0.576 -0.221 0.608 0.890 0.230 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.244 0.000 0.074
F 0.529 2.121 0.289 -0.439 -0.269 0.602 0.869 0.161 0.062 0.136 0.153 0.163 -0.036 0.098
D 0.366 1.577 0.333 -0.379 -0.199 0.600 0.913 0.207 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.063
GR 0.423 1.734 0.377 -0.729 -0.476 0.547 0.908 0.125 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.099
IRL 0.334 1.501 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.588 0.896 0.455 0.000 0.401 0.201 0.456 -0.140 0.140
I 0.445 1.802 0.257 -0.307 -0.142 0.586 0.913 0.165 0.037 0.210 0.169 0.165 -0.043 0.080
L 0.232 1.303 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.521 0.930 1.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.000
NL 0.461 1.855 0.370 0.000 0.000 0.634 0.916 0.428 0.000 0.139 0.119 0.385 -0.066 0.066
P 0.668 3.011 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.638 0.913 0.161 0.000 0.568 1.143 0.194 -0.317 0.317
E 0.430 1.754 0.320 -0.277 -0.155 0.614 0.913 0.149 0.034 0.244 0.184 0.144 -0.039 0.074
S 0.407 1.687 0.172 -0.508 -0.147 0.517 0.815 0.273 0.063 0.464 0.319 0.273 -0.137 0.200
UK 0.558 2.264 0.207 -0.518 -0.243 0.612 0.890 0.199 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.070
Exports Imports
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Appendix E. Robustness checks for investment  
 
Table E1. Private investment: dependent variable      with total GDP, after-tax profit share and interest rate 
 
 
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
DW R
2 Sample
A -0.025 0.155 1.873 1.944 0.547 1962-2013
-2.908 *** 1.750 * 7.516 ***
B -0.025 0.431 2.059 -0.007 0.340 2.038 0.557 1963-2013
-1.260 1.897 * 4.419 *** -1.747 * 1.804 *
DK 0.066 0.068 2.895 -0.008 1.827 0.742 1963-2012
0.695 1.120 10.013 *** -2.137 **
FIN -0.045 -0.078 2.143 0.227 -0.004 1.855 0.802 1963-2012
-5.689 *** -1.098 10.163 *** 2.743 *** -1.863 *
F -0.010 0.171 2.066 -1.062 0.387 1.733 0.791 1962-2013
-1.716 * 2.541 ** 10.926 *** -3.456 *** 3.181 ***
D -0.449 0.033 2.050 0.151 -0.203 0.210 1.711 0.780 1962-2012
-4.709 *** 0.319 10.422 *** 1.802 * -3.196 * 3.875 ***
GR 0.033 0.034 1.948 -0.840 0.338 1.904 0.724 1962-2012
0.699 0.969 10.312 *** -2.533 ** 2.455 **
IRL -0.046 0.363 1.770 -0.009 -0.008 1.993 0.593 1973-2013
-2.551 *** 2.321 ** 5.248 *** -2.851 *** -2.488 **
I -0.012 0.195 1.824 -0.831 0.341 2.082 0.649 1962-2013
-1.549 1.974 ** 8.111 *** -2.346 ** 2.509 **
L -0.029 1.728 2.410 0.273 1963-2013
-1.420 0.160 4.172 ***
NL -0.316 0.109 2.671 -0.266 0.257 0.101 2.173 0.725 1962-2013
-1.969 ** 1.288 9.362 *** -4.561 *** 4.350 *** 2.647 ***
P -0.041 0.025 2.116 2.025 0.485 1962-2013
-2.819 *** 0.460 6.640 ***
E 0.222 0.194 2.342 0.336 1.865 0.763 1961-2013
1.237 1.438 14.625 *** 2.269 **
S 0.098 0.105 2.281 0.274 -0.006 1.777 0.737 1963-2013
1.149 1.621 * 9.214 *** 3.490 *** -1.961 *
UK -0.470 0.057 2.262 -0.207 0.227 1.930 0.676 1961-2013
-1.776 * 1.509 8.635 *** -3.205 * 2.845 ***
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Table E2. Private investment: dependent variable         with G in moving sum 3 years 
 
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
 
 
DW R2 Sample
A -0.019 0.128 1.532 0.051 2.035 0.531 1963-2012
-1.577 1.361 6.619 *** 0.114
B 0.008 0.166 1.818 -1.130 -0.451 1.564 0.707 1971-2012
0.713 1.070 7.645 *** -2.552 ** -3.809 ***
DK -0.017 0.007 2.463 0.019 2.284 0.744 1963-2011
-0.157 0.100 10.170 *** 0.055
FIN -0.510 -0.027 1.344 -0.140 -0.231 -0.483 0.265 0.336 -0.105 1.884 0.839 1972-2012
-3.811 *** -0.394 6.958 *** -2.436 *** -4.213 *** -5.203 *** 3.081 *** 3.925 *** -4.063 ***
F 0.016 0.187 1.378 -0.512 -0.316 2.038 0.898 1978-2012
2.078 ** 2.871 *** 8.782 *** -1.993 ** -4.698 ***
D -0.021 -0.043 1.565 0.112 0.313 1.968 0.739 1964-2012
-2.130 ** -0.402 10.351 *** 0.374 2.155 **
GR 0.114 0.181 1.906 0.789 -0.271 0.128 1.862 0.631 1963-2012
1.130 1.825 * 5.932 *** 2.127 ** -2.021 ** 0.274
IRL 0.004 0.346 0.616 0.105 -0.331 2.002 0.530 1971-2012
0.139 2.252 ** 1.398 0.347 -2.752 ***
I -0.015 0.135 1.397 -0.222 0.324 1.765 0.634 1964-2012
-1.423 1.749 * 7.925 *** -0.590 2.245 **
NL -0.139 0.051 1.857 1.242 -0.348 0.316 0.169 2.184 0.711 1963-2012
-0.871 0.553 8.565 *** 2.602 *** -4.601 *** 4.307 *** 3.696 ***
P -1.765 2.709 0.437 -0.636 1.049 0.067 -0.259 2.055 0.704 1974-2012
-3.090 *** 6.354 *** 0.761 -3.521 * 3.573 *** 2.015 ** -3.090 ***
E 0.303 0.252 2.475 0.115 0.287 1.887 0.829 1964-2012
2.411 ** 2.705 *** 11.725 *** 0.466 2.093 **
S 0.141 0.145 1.911 0.208 1.364 -0.153 2.076 0.813 1972-2012
1.578 2.066 ** 10.163 *** 2.025 ** 1.732 * -1.797 *
UK -0.439 -0.002 1.407 -0.211 -0.513 1.407 -0.239 2.094 0.817 1971-2012
-1.850 * -0.053 8.202 *** -2.970 *** -3.918 ** 8.202 *** -1.808 *
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Table E3. Private investment: dependent variable         and three separate government spending variables (        ) 
 
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
DW R2 Sample
A -0.030 0.245 1.367 0.166 0.649 1.880 0.619 1971-2012
-3.273 *** 2.451 ** 5.382 *** 2.187 ** 2.348 **
B 0.735 1.528 -0.178 -0.610 -0.315 0.181 -0.189 0.529 1.983 0.866 1971-2012
3.329 *** 8.176 *** -2.634 *** -4.562 *** -6.328 *** 2.706 *** -3.076 *** 6.565 ***
DK 0.041 0.042 2.303 0.503 0.168 0.482 -0.761 1.955 0.828 1972-2012
0.409 0.670 10.203 *** 2.024 ** 1.840 * 1.992 ** -2.315 **
FIN -0.231 0.008 1.370 0.170 -0.122 -0.256 -0.473 0.265 0.287 -0.094 2.033 0.927 1972-2012
-2.182 ** 0.123 7.548 *** 2.642 *** -2.269 ** -4.842 *** -5.587 *** 3.247 *** 4.262 *** -4.235 ***
F -1.233 0.103 1.421 0.389 1.128 -0.384 -0.207 -0.229 0.720 -0.150 2.120 0.941 1979-2012
-3.777 *** 1.689 * 8.281 *** 2.848 *** 3.375 *** -5.091 *** -3.393 * -3.649 *** 3.986 *** -3.134 ***
D -0.017 0.017 1.651 -0.351 1.518 0.658 1972-2007
-2.414 ** 0.141 7.343 *** -2.114
GR -1.519 0.030 1.648 1.142 0.338 -0.841 1.156 0.176 -0.290 -0.188 1.881 0.862 1971-2012
-2.411 ** 0.204 5.463 *** 3.879 *** 2.066 ** -5.532 *** 3.829 *** 2.439 ** -2.327 ** -3.677 ***
IRL -0.015 0.420 0.681 0.550 -0.296 1.893 0.570 1971-2012
-0.564 2.789 *** 1.660 * 1.929 * -2.671 ***
I -0.011 0.043 1.590 -0.535 0.443 -0.222 1.891 0.747 1971-2012
-2.017 ** 0.572 9.131 *** -1.944 * 1.846 * -1.810 *
NL -0.226 0.009 1.716 1.036 0.276 0.735 -0.412 0.197 0.373 2.146 0.794 1971-2012
-2.633 *** 0.092 8.466 *** 3.181 *** 2.374 ** 2.970 *** -4.681 *** 3.232 *** 5.427 ***
P -0.022 0.018 1.790 -0.286 0.677 -0.229 -0.264 2.038 0.697 1975-2012
-1.203 0.383 3.882 *** -2.130 ** 2.500 ** -1.678 * -2.282 **
E 0.694 0.104 1.934 -0.594 0.114 -0.250 -0.382 -0.253 -0.087 0.298 -0.039 1.654 0.964 1972-2012
6.293 *** 1.766 * 7.822 *** -2.311 ** 4.120 *** -3.642 *** -5.190 *** -6.005 *** -4.503 *** 6.064 *** -2.012 **
S 0.093 0.103 1.761 0.414 0.458 0.451 2.056 0.861 1972-2012
1.299 1.882 * 12.270 *** 6.018 *** 3.978 *** 2.725 ***
UK -0.238 -0.017 1.287 0.168 0.062 -0.314 -0.728 0.800 -0.256 -0.066 2.142 0.860 1971-2012
-0.875 -0.408 7.891 *** 1.635 * 2.026 ** -4.384 *** -5.192 *** 5.131 *** -2.900 *** -2.505 ***
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Table E4. Private investment: dependent variable         with G in contemporaneous and lagged form, Reduced Sample 1960-2007 
 
 
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
DW R
2 Sample
A -0.021 0.141 1.279 0.793 -0.172 1.953 0.476 1971-2007
-1.365 1.329 2.864 *** 1.733 * -1.482
B -0.007 0.364 1.931 -0.418 -0.491 1.532 0.725 1972-2007
-0.541 1.533 7.141 *** -0.753 -3.811 ***
DK -0.026 0.016 3.270 0.492 -0.088 -0.383 1.809 0.807 1973-2007
-0.330 0.326 13.105 *** 1.263 -2.459 ** -1.818 *
FIN -0.429 -0.011 1.555 -0.123 -0.270 -0.444 0.162 0.402 -0.103 2.098 0.920 1972-2007
-2.978 *** -0.150 6.563 *** -2.118 ** -4.640 *** -4.716 *** 1.624 * 4.498 *** -3.994 ***
F 0.017 0.222 1.319 -0.532 -0.327 1.776 0.894 1978-2007
2.246 ** 3.421 *** 7.330 *** -2.983 *** -5.335 ***
D -0.020 -0.052 1.536 0.037 0.297 1.938 0.668 1961-2007
-1.646 * -0.482 7.760 0.208 1.941 *
GR 0.020 0.067 1.387 0.770 2.110 0.461 1961-2007
0.261 0.876 4.452 2.098 **
IRL 0.327 0.182 0.412 -0.698 -0.401 0.076 0.313 -0.130 1.892 0.526 1971-2007
1.511 0.931 0.738 -3.344 *** -2.753 0.777 * 1.966 * -2.754 ***
I -0.016 0.109 1.242 0.238 -0.141 1.611 0.520 1962-2007
-1.683 * 1.116 5.937 *** 2.043 ** -0.510
NL -0.036 0.231 1.550 0.617 1.716 0.483 1962-2007
-2.445 ** 2.222 ** 6.114 *** 1.797 *
P -2.176 -0.030 2.218 0.758 -0.667 1.046 -0.148 2.146 0.720 1974-2007
-4.056 *** -0.672 4.612 *** 1.847 * -3.723 ** 3.686 *** -2.002 **
E -1.476 0.077 1.765 0.460 -0.186 -0.254 -0.426 0.580 0.489 1.720 0.917 1973-2007
-2.019 ** 0.534 3.098 *** 2.316 ** -1.320 -3.169 *** -3.257 * 3.116 *** 1.784 *
S 0.154 0.152 1.821 1.461 -0.179 1.625 0.759 1971-2007
1.626 * 2.053 ** 6.015 *** 2.758 *** -2.061 **
UK -0.668 0.008 1.200 -0.180 -0.531 0.650 1.929 0.746 1971-2007
-1.775 * 0.194 6.352 *** -2.236 ** -3.582 ** 3.185 ***
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Appendix F. Policy mix and further effects 
 
Table F1. The total effect of an isolated 1% point fall in profit share, a 1% point increase in government expenditure, a 1% point increase in capital 
taxation or a 1% point fall in labour taxation on investment and net exports 
 
 
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
Total effect of     on I / Y Total effect of     on NX / Y Total effect of G on I/Y Total effect of G on NX /Y Total effect of t r  on I/Y Total effect of t w on I /Y
A 0.054 -0.444 1.125 -0.482 -0.036 0.210
B -0.380 0.035 0.437 -0.639 -0.121 0.347
DK 0.078 -0.233 0.319 -0.218 -0.021 0.130
FIN 0.154 -0.138 2.045 -0.494 -0.043 0.645
F -0.071 -0.119 0.265 -0.071 -0.106 0.545
D 0.243 -0.155 0.740 -0.414 -0.035 0.226
GR 0.485 -0.210 1.828 -0.327 -0.134 0.345
IRL 0.036 -0.213 0.810 -0.824 -0.012 0.526
I -0.073 -0.084 0.315 -0.091 -0.062 0.088
L 0.013 -0.104 0.084 -0.680 -0.004 0.017
NL -0.107 -0.128 0.987 -0.631 -0.125 0.252
P 0.057 -0.345 1.563 -0.809 -0.035 0.835
E 0.622 -0.214 1.940 -0.297 -0.050 0.725
S -0.022 -0.270 1.461 -0.822 -0.054 0.282
UK 0.138 -0.140 0.345 -0.406 -0.022 0.241
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Table F2. The total effect of a simultaneous 1% point fall in profit share, a 1% point increase in government expenditure, a 1% point increase in 
capital taxation or a 1% point fall in labour taxation on investment and net exports 
 
 
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
* Change in each country is multiplier by its share in EU15 GDP 
Total effect of     on I / Y Total effect of     on NX / Y Total effect of G on I/Y Total effect of G on NX /Y Total effect of t r  on I/Y Total effect of t w on I /Y
A 0.310 -0.020 1.455 0.065 -0.067 0.365
B -0.261 0.393 0.746 0.099 -0.150 0.488
DK 0.175 0.005 0.500 0.225 -0.038 0.215
FIN 0.369 0.186 2.967 0.058 -0.107 0.960
F 0.009 0.046 0.495 0.248 -0.124 0.635
D 0.312 -0.005 0.907 -0.047 -0.051 0.302
GR 0.692 -0.055 2.268 0.002 -0.176 0.555
IRL 0.122 -0.084 0.929 -0.488 -0.023 0.580
I -0.013 0.156 0.487 0.406 -0.078 0.171
L 0.138 0.372 0.416 0.577 -0.035 0.173
NL 0.124 0.126 1.553 -0.010 -0.178 0.519
P 0.164 -0.161 1.852 -0.485 -0.060 0.960
E 0.755 -0.076 2.288 -0.001 -0.084 0.884
S 0.190 0.044 1.956 -0.308 -0.098 0.496
UK 0.175 -0.029 0.429 -0.190 -0.030 0.277
Average* 0.20 0.036 0.92 0.045 -0.08 0.42
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Table F3. Total effects of a policy mix on budget balance following an isolated change in each country 
  
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
 
 
1%-point fall 
in profit share
1%-point increase  
in public spending
1%-point increase in 
taxation on capital 
income
1%-point fall in taxation 
on wage income
Combined effect 
on budget balance
A B C D E
A 0.044 -0.493 0.245 0.772 0.569
B -0.028 -0.927 0.271 0.637 -0.047
DK 0.085 -0.649 0.262 0.725 0.423
FIN 0.071 -0.445 0.258 0.728 0.613
F 0.081 -0.719 0.206 0.826 0.394
D 0.267 -0.545 0.275 0.848 0.844
GR 0.005 -0.986 0.359 0.552 -0.070
IRL 0.004 -0.984 0.304 0.597 -0.079
I 0.009 -0.789 0.300 0.646 0.166
L 0.005 -0.970 0.409 0.527 -0.030
NL 0.045 -0.543 0.220 0.812 0.535
P 0.040 -0.610 0.245 0.824 0.499
E 0.508 0.074 0.255 1.080 1.917
S 0.036 -0.744 0.288 0.571 0.151
UK 0.094 -0.858 0.261 0.717 0.214
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Table F4. The effect of a 1% point increase in the wage share on annual inflation and nominal unit labour costs 
  
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
 
 
 
1% point simultaneous 
increase in the wage 
share
ULC Annual inflation Annual inflation
A 3.062 1.603 1.777
B 1.893 0.405 0.700
DK 2.785 1.296 1.603
FIN 3.037 1.574 1.845
F 3.059 1.617 1.833
D 2.399 0.878 1.166
GR 2.877 1.217 1.452
IRL 2.288 0.764 0.875
I 2.807 1.249 1.442
L 2.325 0.541 0.773
NL 2.680 1.235 1.386
P 4.307 2.877 3.102
E 2.605 1.120 1.362
S 2.661 1.083 1.335
UK 3.289 1.836 2.066
Average 2.805 1.286 1.515
1% point increase in the 
wage share in isolation
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Table F5. Three policy scenarios with disaggregated government expenditures  
 
Note: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S 
= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP. See Appendix B for details. 
Excess 
Demand 
/ Y
Multiplier % change in 
aggregate 
demand 
(A*B)
The effects of a 
simultaneous 1%-point 
increase in Ig 
on % change in aggregate 
demand
Excess 
Demand 
/ Y 
Multiplier % change in 
aggregate 
demand 
(E*F)
The effects of a 
simultaneous 1%-point 
increase in Gi 
on % change in aggregate 
demand
Excess 
Demand 
/ Y
Multiplier % change in 
aggregate 
demand  
(I*J)
The effects of a simultaneous 1%-
point increase in Gc
on % change in aggregate demand
A B C D E F G H I J K L
A 1.010 2.048 2.067 3.679 1.011 2.048 2.070 3.718 1.000 2.048 2.048 4.294
B 0.844 1.185 1.000 2.576 0.923 1.185 1.094 2.704 0.918 1.185 1.088 3.279
DK 0.997 2.191 2.185 3.391 0.994 2.191 2.177 3.410 1.008 2.191 2.209 3.890
FIN 0.729 4.682 3.412 7.698 0.729 4.682 3.412 7.794 0.720 4.682 3.372 9.344
F 0.796 3.395 2.703 3.868 0.885 3.395 3.005 4.182 1.841 3.395 6.249 7.721
D 1.000 2.256 2.256 3.208 1.000 2.256 2.256 3.233 0.993 2.256 2.241 3.625
GR 1.009 5.055 5.103 7.233 0.993 5.055 5.020 7.200 1.005 5.055 5.083 8.061
IRL 0.875 1.176 1.029 1.691 0.912 1.176 1.072 1.749 1.222 1.176 1.437 2.356
I 1.000 1.718 1.718 2.632 0.993 1.718 1.705 2.641 2.583 1.718 4.437 5.627
L 1.000 0.560 0.560 2.698 1.000 0.560 0.560 2.746 1.000 0.560 0.560 3.529
NL 1.020 2.760 2.816 5.999 1.001 2.760 2.763 6.022 1.017 2.760 2.806 7.273
P 0.875 3.460 3.026 4.601 0.876 3.460 3.032 4.643 0.875 3.460 3.026 5.219
E 0.923 4.680 4.321 6.109 0.950 4.680 4.446 6.272 0.988 4.680 4.624 7.161
S 0.936 3.239 3.033 5.767 0.916 3.239 2.966 5.764 0.562 3.239 1.820 5.669
UK 0.937 2.330 2.182 2.748 0.938 2.330 2.186 2.765 0.933 2.330 2.174 2.985
EU15 GDP* 3.71 3.80 5.15
Increase in government spending 
in social infrastructure (G i ) by 1% point
Scenario 2
Increase in other government spending (G c) 
by 1% point
Scenario 3Scenario 1
Increase in public investment (I g ) 
by 1% point
